University of Cincinnati College of Law

University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications
Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-1998

Beyond Misguided Paternalism: Resuscitating the
Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
S. Elizabeth Malloy
University of Cincinnati College of Law, betsy.malloy@uc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Health Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Malloy, S. Elizabeth, "Beyond Misguided Paternalism: Resuscitating the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment" (1998). Faculty Articles
and Other Publications. Paper 41.
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs/41

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles and Other Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Cincinnati
College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact ken.hirsh@uc.edu.

BEYOND MISGUIDED PATERNALISM:
RESUSCITATING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL
TREATMENT
S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy*

The author focuses on the failure of the courts to provide a remedy for the right to refuse medical treatment. Health care providers, for a number of reasons, often ignore patient requests to
forgo certain life-extending medical procedures. The courts
have generally allowed medical professionals complete discretion in deciding whether to honor patients' requests. When patients or their estates sue health care providers for violation of
the right to refuse treatment, courts have refused to award
damages. By failing to provide a remedy, the courts effectively
make the right a meaningless one. While acknowledging the
importance of physician autonomy, the author argues that the
courts' one-sided approach to this dilemma is unsound. To implement the right, the author advocates and describes a new
approach under which courts would consider not only the special context in which this issue generally arises but also the important autonomy interests inherent in the right to refuse medical treatment.
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INTRODUCTION

The common law has long recognized an individual's right to
self-determination over her own body, free from interference by others. I This right of self-determination expresses the principles, or
value choice, of personal autonomy. It includes decisions such as
those relating to the medical care that we choose to receive.
Today new biomedical technologies such as respirators, cardiac
pacemakers, and kidney dialysis units have greatly increased medicine's capacity to extend human life. 2 Although in many cases these
technologies extend life, often they only extend the process of dying. 3
Modern medicine frequently permits individuals to live with what
were previously fatal diseases, but it often cannot cure or reverse
those illnesses entirely.4 Consequently, a person is not restored to a

1. For a general discussion of the principles of self-determination and
autonomy, see H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETIDCS
264 (1986), which states that "[o]ne of the ancient presumptions of English law
is that individuals should be secure in their bodies against the unauthorized
touching of others," and Sylvia A Law, Silent No More: Physicians' Legal and
Ethical Obligations to Patients Seeking Abortions, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 279, 285 (1994-1995), which comments that "[p]atients' rights to selfdetermination and autonomy in medical decision-making have deep historic
roots and command broad respect as abstract principles."
2. According to one historian, "[nlinety percent of the medicine being
practiced today did not exist in 1950." John Steele Gordon, How America's
Health Care Fell Ill, AM. HERITAGE, May-June 1992, at 49, 49.
3. See LIFE CHOICES: A HAsTINGS CENTER INTRODUCTION TO BIOETHICS 134
(Joseph H. Howell & William Frederick Sale eds., 1995) (discussing the new array of ethical issues that arise from advances in medical technology). Justice
Brennan noted that:
The timing of death-once a matter of fate-is now a matter of human choice. Of the approximately 2 million people who die each year,
80% die in hospitals and long-term care institutions, perhaps 70% of
those after a decision to forego life-sustaining treatment has been
made. Nearly every death involves a decision whether to undertake
some medical procedure that could prolong the process of dying.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 302 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
4. See PRESIDENT'S COMMN FOR THE STUDY OF ETillCAL PROBLEMS IN MED.
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFESUSTAINING TREAThiENT 3 (1983). The study states:
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fully functioning life. Unfortunately, many patients who have had
their lives extended by modern medical advancements find their
physical and psychological existence to be unsatisfactory.5 Beginning in the early 1900s, some patients attempted to avoid that outcome by "asserting a right to die a natural death, without undue dependence on medical technology or ... a right to 'die with dignity.",6
In recent years, a legal consensus has evolved that competent patients have a near absolute right to refuse medical treatmene This
right also rests with the legal surrogates of incompetent patients,
who may decline treatment on the incompetent patients' behalf. 8

The voluntary choice of a competent and informed patient should determine whether or not life-sustaining therapy will be undertaken,
just as such choices provide the basis for other decisions about medical treatment. Health care institutions and professionals should try
to enhance patients' abilities to make decisions on their own behalf
and to promote understanding of the available treatment options.
Id. The median life e}.llectancy is now 79 for women and 72 for men. See
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1995, at 86 (115th ed. 1995).
5. As Jonathan Swift observed, "[e]very Man desires to live long; but no
Man would be old." JONATHAN SWIFT, Thoughts on Various Subjects, in SATIRES
AND PERSONAL WRITINGS 406, 414 (William Alfred Eddy ed., 1932). Both public
opinion polls and scientific studies show that many people prefer not to be
placed on life-support systems. See James Lindgren, Death by Default, 56 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 197-99 (1993) (reviewing medical opinion polls and discussing the individual's fear of being placed on life support and losing the ability to make medical decisions for him or herself).
6. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (N.J. 1985); see also Judith C. Areen,
Bioethics and the Law: The Second Stage: Balancing Intelligent Consent and
Individual Autonomy, 31 ARIz. L. REV. 447, 449-51 (1989) (recognizing that until the 1900s there was no recognition of informed consent). For a history of the
patient autonomy movement, see PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE 389-93 (1982).
7. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (indicating that competent persons have a
"constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment"); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J. 1976) (recognizing that
the right to privacy includes the right to refuse medical treatment). Every state
and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes that enable patients to
make end-of-life decisions in the form of advance directives. See The New DNR
Laws: Pros and Cons, CHOICE IN DYING (National" Council for the Right to Die,
New York, N.Y.), Spring 1993, at 1 (listing and discussing advance directive
statutes in the various states); see also GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT,
TRAGIC CHOICES 16-17, 56 (1978) (coining the term "tragic choice" to describe
situations in which a legal system must allocate burdens and benefits involving
great suffering or death); 2 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE, § 12.25, at 171
n.135 (2d ed. 1995) (presenting a comprehensive account of practices and laws
governing the foregoing of life-sustaining treatment and surrogate decisionmaking); Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on
Roe, Casey, and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 803, 841 (1995) (discussing
the policies behind the right to refuse treatment).
8. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1227-28.
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As the right to refuse treatment gained social acceptance, more
people chose to exercise that righe It is clear, however, that physicians have not accorded the same respect to the right as has society.lO Some evidence suggests that many physicians are keeping patients alive against their wishes. l l Some physicians are motivated
to keep patients alive because of liability concerns, the promise of
new life-sustaining technology, or even financial considerations. 12
As a result, physicians frequently will override patient decisions to
refuse medical treatment because of a belief that respecting the patient's request would not be in the patient's or the doctor's best interest. 13
Due to the medical profession'S failure to honor consistently the
right to refuse medical treatment, a growing number of patients (or
their estates) have filed lawsuits alleging that patients who received
unwanted life-sustaining treatment suffered a compensable injury.14
9. See Robert L. Jayes et al., Do-Nat-Resuscitate Orders in Intensive Care
Units: Current Practices and Recent Changes, 270 JAMA 2213, 2215 (1993)
(discussing a recent study showing that, from 1988 to 1990, almost twice as
many intensive care unit patients had do not resuscitate ("DNR") orders as did
patients from 1979 to 1982); see also Areen, supra note 6, at 449 (commenting
that the emergence of a patient's rights movement over the past few decades
has reduced the traditional autonomy of the medical profession).
10. See David Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient Choice in End-at-Life Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101, 2102 (1992) (noting that physicians' values dominate
end-of-life decision-making although physicians' do a poor job of eliciting patient values and preferences and are unaware of what the patient really wants);
see also Susan Gilbert, Study Finds Doctors Refuse Patients'Requests on Death,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, at Al (quoting Dr. William Kraus as saying,
"[although] [p]eople think advance directives are solving the problem ... [w]e
have very good information that they aren't, that nothing has changed-the
amount of pain at the end of life, the number of people dying alone attached to
machines").
11. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 1-29 (1984)
(noting that, historically, medical practitioners treated patients paternalistically and resisted efforts by courts and patients to increase patient participation in medical decision-making).
12. See, e.g., DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN
AGING SOCIETY 160-64 (1987) (discussing the influence of advanced medical
technology); Merrijoy Kelner et al., Advance Directives: The Views of Health
Care Professionals, 148 CANADIAN MED. Ass'N J. 1331, 1335-36 (1993)
(discussing the reservations that physicians have about advanced directives);
Tony Smith, Cheap Managed Death, 310 BRIT. MED. J. 744 (1995) (stating that
doctors have ethical and financial incentives to keep patients alive).
13. See Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study of Advance Directives for
Life-Sustaining Care, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 882, 886 (1991). An advance directive study tried to discover why living wills are sometimes disregarded by physicians. See id. at 882-87. Researchers concluded that physicians override advance directives when they disagree with the patient's choices and feel that the
undesired treatment is appropriate. See id.
14. See, e.g., Ross v. Hilltop Rehab. Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528, 1530 (D.
Colo. 1987); McVey v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 524 A.2d 450, 452 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1987); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., 507 A.2d 718,
719 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); Elbaum v. Grace Plaza, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d
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The majority of these suits have relied on traditional tort theory.I5
Generally, these suits claim that the patient suffered a diminished
quality of life after receiving undesired medical treatment, which
violated a personal autonomy interest. 16
To date, no courts have permitted recovery for violation of the
right to refuse treatment. 17 Many courts have not even permitted
such causes of action to proceed. IS The reasons for this lack of remedy are complex and varied. Some courts have been willing to
overlook the harm caused to a person kept alive against his or her
,vill if the court finds that he or she is not experiencing painespecially those patients who never regain consciousness. 19 Under840, 845-48 (App. Div. 1989); Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671
N.E.2d 225, 226 (Ohio 1996); 1 MEISEL, supra note 7, § 3.4, at 51.
15. For a discussion of theories advanced in cases seeking damages for
failure to honor patients' refusal of treatment, see M. Rose Gasner, Financial
Penalties for Failing to Honor Patient Wishes to Refuse Treatment, 11 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 499, 504-12 (1992), David H. Miller, Right-to-Die Damage Actions: Developments in the Law, 65 DENV. U. L. REV. 181, 185-97 (1989), and
Steven 1. Addlestone, Note, Liability for Improper Maintenance of Life Support:
Balancing Patient and Physician Autonomy, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1255, 1267-73
(1993).
16. See, e.g., Elbaum, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 847; Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 226.
17. See Elena N. Cohen, Death and Dying, 1 BioLaw (Univ. Pub. Am.) § 12,
at R:262 (July 1989) (reporting no significant damages awards have been won
by patients in the United States). Although no reported cases exist in which
the court awarded damages for the unwanted imposition of life-sustaining
treatment, there have been some jury verdicts and settlements in which the
plaintiff recovered damages. See Gasner, supra note 15, at 504-12 (discussing
the dismissal and settlement of various cases and contemplating alternative
theories of recovery which may prove successful in future litigation); Miller, supra note 15, at 197-98 (stating that plaintiffs fair poorly in front of judges). In
addition, one court has recognized the potential for a cause of action. See Estate
of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing
the potential for a battery action when a patient is resuscitated against her
wishes). Another case awarded an injunction so that the plaintiff could have
the life-sustaining treatment removed. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 307 (Ct. App. 1986) (granting injunction to patient who wished to
have medical care terminated).
18. See Gasner, supra note 15, at 504-12 (discussing the failure of plaintiffs
to recover for violations of their right to refuse treatment); Miller, supra note
15, at 185 (reviewing the dismal prospects for patients in such damage actions).
19. These courts focus on the fact that many who are suffering from terminal illnesses may be experiencing little or no pain, or have lost consciousness.
The courts thus reason that an individual in such a state suffers no harm if he
or she is kept alive. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 301, 320 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (voicing complaint that the majority failed to realize the harm to individual autonomy when an individual,
even one in a persistent vegetative state is kept alive against his or her
wishes); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 184, 191 (1993) (arguing that
an individual can be harmed by being kept alive against his or her will, or, if
the individual lacks consciousness, against whatever values informed his or her
active life); JOEL FEINBERG, An Unpromising Approach to the "Right to Die," in
FREEDOM AND FuLFILLMENT: PHILOSOPIllCAL ESSAYS 260, 278 (1992) (discussing
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standably, judges are also reluctant to provide a remedy (i.e., award
damages) because to do so would ostensibly mean that the court favored death over life. 20 To avoid this dilemma, courts have manipulated tort concepts to validate life-prolonging measures under
almost any circumstances, even when a competent patient has decided to refuse treatment. 21 In so doing, the courts render ineffective the right to refuse treatment. 22 Physicians can sustain life,
sometimes for months or even years, for people who are near death
(or horribly diseased), sedated into near oblivion, and connected to
dozens of machines that do most of the individual's ''living.,,2.3 Understandably, many ofthese patients have expressed a wish to die. 24
In addition to thwarting an individual's autonomy, violation of
the right to die with dignity has other repercussions, including the
emotional and financial toll on a patient's family and loved ones. 25
Moreover, society has an interest in making sure that people are not
kept alive against their wishes. Most people think that the way
they die and their attitude towards death bear crucially on the
value of their lives. 26 As legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin has obthe harm to an individual's autonomy rights when his or her last wishes are not
respected).
20. See, e.g., Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228 (holding that life is not a compensable injury and refusing to recognize wrongful living as a cause of action).
21. See, e.g., Addelstone, supra note 15, at 1268-71 (discussing the courts'
failure to provide a remedy for violation of the right to refuse treatment using
ordinary tort principles).
22. See Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal
Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 735, 735-36 (1992) (arguing that a tight fit between rights and remedies does not exist for many constitutional rights). William Blackstone recognized that "it is a general and indisputable rule, that
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at
law, whenever that right is invaded." 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COJ\Il\IENTARIES
*23. Furthermore, Blackstone noted that "it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right when ,vith-held must have a remedy, and every injury it's [sic] proper redress." Id. at :::109; see also Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803) (stating the general maxim that
for every right there is a remedy).
23. See DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 61 (providing an elegant and powerful
restatement of the view that in a pluralistic society individuals should have
rights against governmental interference ,vith deeply personal "private
choices," such as abortion and euthanasia).
24. See Nicholas G. Smedira et al., Withholding and Withdrawal of Life
Support from the Critically Ill, 322 NEW ENG. J. MEn. 309, 311 (1990); see also
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (''Medical advances have altered the physiological conditions of death in ways that may be alarming:
Highly invasive treatment may perpetuate human existence through a merger
of body and machine that some might reasonably regard as an insult to life
rather than as its continuation.").
25. See Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy
Age, 68lND. L.J. 727, 737 (1993).
26. See DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 199 (stating that individuals worry
about the impact of "life's last stage on the character of [their] life as a whole,
as we might worry about the effect of a play's last scene or a poem's last stanza
on the entire creative work").
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served, "[m]aking someone die in a way that others approve, but he
believes a horrifying contradiction of his life, is a devastating, odious form of tyranny.'>27
My conclusion is that respect for individual autonomy should be
the primary (but not the only) factor in deciding whether to afford a
remedy for violations of the right to refuse medical treatment. People have a right to forgo treatment-without financial or legal penalty to themselves or those they love-because this decision is one
central to personal autonomy.28 A society that allows the refusal of
medical treatment is a better one.29 Of course, greater autonomy in
this area is not without cost, such as an increased risk of involuntary death,30 and perhaps an implicit financial pressure on ailing
patients to die sooner than they might otherwise wish. 31 On balance, however, freedom to make this decision, and to see that the
choice is respected by the medical profession, seems worth the
price.!l2 Thus, the courts can best serve what people perceive as
their critical interests by deferring to their autonomous choices,
even when the court disagrees with these choices. 33 To do this,

27. Id. at 217.
See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent,
Justice Stevens notes:
Choices about death touch the core of liberty. Our duty, and the concomitant freedom, to come to terms with the conditions of our own
morality are undoubtedly "so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," and indeed are essential incidents of the unalienable rights to life and liberty endowed us
by our Creator.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
29. See Dworkin, supra note 25, at 727 (discussing the importance of
autonomy in American culture).
30. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280-81 (1990) (holding that state interest in
preventing error and abuse in the right to refuse treatment arena justified its
clear and convincing evidence standard). See generally Yale Kamisar, Some
Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 969 (1958) (arguing against any expansion of the right to refuse treatment, on the ground that it would be impossible to devise safeguards that are
both workable and adequately protective).
31. See David Myland Kaufman & Richard B. Lipton, The Persistent Vegetative State: An Analysis of Clinical Correlates and Costs, 92 N.Y. ST. J. MED.
381, 383 (1992) (finding that the bills for 13 patients in a persistent vegetative
state averaged $170,000 and the length of stay at the hospital averaged almost
200 days). For a discussion of health care payment alternatives, see Ezekiel J.
Emanuel, Cost Savings At the End of Life: What Do the Data Show? 275 JAMA
1907 (1996), and David E. Joranson, Are Health Care Reimbursement Policies a
Barrier to Acute and Cancer Pain Management?, 9 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGl\1T.
244 (1994).
32. See Eric Rakowski, The Sanctity of Human Life, 103 YALE L.J. 2049,
2100-01 (1994) (book review).
33. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cohen v. California:
"Inconsequential" Cases and Larger Principles, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1251, 1252-54
(1996) (citing cases where various United States Supreme Court Justices up28.
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courts must be prepared to provide a remedy when a patient has effectively exercised his or her right to refuse treatment.
To accommodate these interests properly, the court's focus must
shift from a philosophical discourse about the value and sanctity of
life to a greater understanding and appreciation of the aftermath of
a violation of one's right to refuse treatment. Keeping individuals
alive after they have made a competent determination to refuse
medical treatment has a huge impact and does a great deal of damage to their autonomy right, their loved ones, the medical profession, and society. Sharpening the focus leads to two preliminary
conclusions about the current application of tort rules that proscribe
liability for failing to follow a patient's wishes. First, courts should
not view the patient's decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment as
one that a physician or hospital may ignore without consequence.
By failing to impose liability when a patient has decided to refuse
treatment, the courts ignore a patient's autonomy interests and impose their own moral judgment on the situation, determining paternalistically that the choice to forgo treatment was incorrect or at
least unworthy of respect by the legal system.34 Second, although
the current legal structure provides the necessary doctrine to which
plaintiffs can turn for remedy, legislative action might be necessary
if plaintiffs are to receive compensation for such injuries.
This Article argues that the courts, and if necessary the legislatures, should ensure that patients have a remedy for violation of the
important right to refuse medical treatment. 35 First, this Article
explores the importance of an individual's autonomy interests in
being allowed to make certain medical decisions. Part I considers
relevant state and federal statutes and case law that have defined
the right to refuse medical treatment. Part II discusses a recent
case involving a violation of the right to refuse treatment and examines the court's rationale for refusing to provide a remedy.
held the principles of fundamental freedoms even though they themselves felt
the exercise of those freedoms to be "absurd" or "immature").
34. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 228
(Ohio 1996) (holding that no "wrongful living" cause of action exists for the improper administration of life prolonging medical treatment). But see Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that "[t]he
right to refuse medical treatment is basic and fundamental," and its exercise
may not be "overridden by medical opinion").
35. Some commentators support the recovery of damages when a physician
interferes ,vith the patient's right to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Developments
in the Law, Medical Technology and the Law, 103 lIARv. L. REv. 1519, 1673
(1990); William C. Knapp & Fred Hamilton, "Wrongful Living": Resuscitation as
Tortious Interference with a Patient's Right to Give Informed Refusal, 19 N. Ky.
L. REV. 253, 254-59 (1992); A. Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the
Right to Die: The Wrongful Living Cause ofAction, 75 GEO. L.J. 625, 665 (1986);
Nancy K Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 lIARv. L. REV. 375, 430 (1988);
Tricia Jones Hackleman, Comment, Violation of an Individual's Right to Die:
The Need for a Wrongful Living Cause ofAction, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1355 (1996).
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In addition, the Article will review the treatment of other fundamental rights (such as abortion) and compare remedies for violations of these rights with the lack of remedy for the right to refuse
medical treatment.36 When denials and violations of these other
rights occur, both state and federal courts have not hesitated to protect the individual's exercise of the right, even if it finds the exercise
distasteful or disagrees with the choice.
Finally, Part III of the Article suggests how courts and legislatures could enforce remedies for this right by seeking a creative approach to this difficult problem.
1.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL AUTONOlVIY AND THE RIGHT TO
REFUSE TREATMENT

Respect for individuality and autonomy have long been central
values in our society and legal system.37 Personal autonomy requires recognition of one's rights to hold certain views, to make
one's own choices, and to act on the basis of one's personal values
and beliefs, even when others may believe you were mistaken. 38 In
general, the more intense and personal the consequences of a choice
and the less direct or significant the impact of that choice on others,
the more compelling the claim to autonomy in the making of a given
decision. 39 Under this criterion, the case for respecting patient
autonomy in decisions about individual health40 and bodily fate is
36. See infra notes 232-39 and accompanying text.
37. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
38. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIO·
MEDICAL ETHICS 62, 82-87 (3d ed. 1989) (providing a full discussion of the new
emphasis on patient autonomy concerns in bioethics); MaIjorie Maguire Shultz,
From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE
L.J. 219, 222 (1985) (arguing that medical treatment choices are vital to a person's individual autonomy interests). For an overview of the informed consent
doctrine, see RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT (1986).
39. The claim to autonomy was most compellingly expressed by John Stuart Mill:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilised [sic] community, against his ,vill, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant.... [T]he conduct from which it is desired to deter
him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only
part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY 12-13 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1989) (1859).
40. In Western medicine, deference to the patient's interest is rooted in the
Hippocratic tradition and in the doctor's status as a fiduciary. See ROBERT M.
VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 21-25 (1981). Under these principles,
the doctor's interest in income, prestige, and convenience, as well as in his or
her own professional opinions and references, constitutes a less immediate and
compelling claim to authority than that which derives from the patient's status
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very strong.41 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that "[n]o right
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority oflaw.'>42
Central to the right to bodily integrity is the common law doctrine of consent. 43 Strictly speaking, every unauthorized touching of
a person may constitute a battery,44 and only the fact of consent
renders the touching lawful.45 Consequently, in the medical context,
the administration of medical treatment which involves any touching without the consent of the patient is prima facie unlawful46 and
may give rise to civil liability.47 Because the unlawfulness stems
as the bearer ofthe consequences. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (recognizing the physician's duty to keep a patient informed of
medical procedures); In re Conroy, 486 A2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985) ("The doctrine of informed consent is the primary means developed in the law to protect
this personal interest in the integrity of one's body."); see also Danuta Mendelson, Historical Evolution and Modern Implications of Concepts of Consent to,
and Refusal ot Medical Treatment in the Law of Trespass, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 1,
4 (1996) (noting that in bioethics, the terms "autonomy" and "respect for autonomy" are associated with several ideas, such as privacy, voluntariness, choosing
freely, and accepting responsibility for these choices).
41. The classic statement of bodily value, in the medical conte}..-t, was expressed by Judge Cardozo, who stated: "Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and
a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent, commits an
assault ...." Schloendorfi'v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y.
1914). A more recent statement of the importance of patient autonomy is found
in 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMN FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE
ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENTPRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 2-4 (1982) (recommending that health care institutions and professionals try to enhance patients' abilities to make decisions on
their own behalves and to promote understanding of the available treatment
options).
42. Botsford, 141 U.S. at 251 (refusing to compel personal injury plaintiff to
undergo pretrial medical examination).
43. See James Lindgren, Death by Default, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185,
188-89 (1993) (stating that the common law doctrine of consent embodies following a competent person's treatment decisions).
44. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS
§ 9, at 41 (5th ed. 1984).
45. See id. § 9, at 42.
46. There are some exceptions, for example, in cases of emergency where
treatment is necessary to save the patient's life but the patient is unable to give
consent to that treatment. See, e.g., Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d
1047, 1052 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (holding that medical treatment will be lawful
under the doctrine of implied consent when a medical emergency requires immediate action to preserve the health or life of the patient). Some statutory exceptions have also been created regarding the requirement of consent through
public health and mental health legislation. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachuetts, 197 U.S. 11,37-38 (1905) (upholding compulsory vaccination laws).
47. To sustain an action for battery, two elements must be satisfied: 1) intent to cause harmful, or offensive touching to another; and 2) the harmful con-
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from the fact of the non-consensual touching itself, the contact to
the patient need not be harmful to give rise to liability, nor is there
any requirement that the touching be done with hostility.48 It is
therefore no defense that the treatment or procedure was skillfully
performed, or that it was medically necessary and actually benefited
the patient.49 When, however, a patient with decision-making capacity has given a legally effective consent to the particular intervention,50 the patient's consent is a complete defense to any action
for damages based on the tort of battery. 51
The common law doctrine of "informed consent" has evolved
from these fundamental principles and provides a firm basis for legal recognition of the right of a patient with decision-making capacity to refuse treatment. 52 Pursuant to this doctrine, a doctor must
make full disclosure to a patient of all proposed medical procedures,
the material risks of those procedures, and alternative courses of acduct must occur. See Love v. City of Port Clinton, 524 N.E.2d 166, 167 (Ohio
1988) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965». Any intentional,
unwanted, harmful or offensive touching constitutes battery. See KEETON ET
AL., supra note 44, § 9, at 41.
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 15 cmt. a; see also, e.g., Cobbs v.
Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1972) (en banc) (holding an operation without consent is battery, but an operation where the patient consents to one type of
treatment and receives another is negligence); Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25,
31 (Ohio 1956) (holding that a battery occurs when a doctor performs treatment
in the absence of consent).
49. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 44, § 9, at 41 ("[T]he defendant is liable
not only for contacts which do actual physical harm, but also for those relatively trivial ones which are merely offensive and insulting."). A battery may
be committed "even though the procedure is harmless or beneficial." Shapiro,
469 N.E.2d at 1051. Thus, even actions such as placing a patient on a machine
which enables the patient to breathe or receive nutrition, or resuscitating a patient's heart, could give rise to a plausible cause of action for battery if the
treatment was not desired.
50. For a consent to medical treatment to be legally effective the medical
procedure or treatment must be one to which the person can give a legally valid
consent, have the legal capacity to give a valid consent, and be a real consenti.e., it must be voluntarily given ,vith respect to the particular procedure or
treatment performed by a particular individual, and the person must be aware,
in broad terms, of the nature and purpose ofthe treatment to which he or she is
consenting. See Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REv. 291, 352 n.218, 379-80 (1994).
51. See Lacey, 139 N.E.2d at 32.
52. The doctrine of informed consent is founded on the common law tort of
battery. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 44, § 9, at 39-42. The doctrine of informed consent affirms a patient's right to determine his or her own destiny in
medical matters, promotes autonomy, guards against overreaching on the part
of the physician, protects physical and psychic integrity and thus privacy, and
compensates both from affronts to dignity and from some of the unintended
consequences of modern medical care. See Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the
Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in
Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIS. L. REv. 413, 414-15; see also, Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REv. 137, 147-50
(1977) (discussing the history of the informed consent doctrine).

HeinOnline -- 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1045 1998

1046

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

tion. 53 On the basis of the information received from the doctor, the
patient may then choose among the available treatment options. 54
The doctrine therefore establishes an obligation of health care professionals to respect patients' rights in making treatment decisions.55 This right of a patient with decision-making capacity to give
consent to treatment, after having been fully informed as to the material risks of the proposed treatment, logically involves a corresponding right to refuse treatment. 56
These common law background principles provided the foundation for courts that faced the task of addressing and defining an individual's right to refuse medical treatment, including lifesustaining treatment.57 The doctrine of informed consent, which in53. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 776, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(permitting action against surgeon and hospital for paralysis resulting from
back operation without adequate disclosure of risks); Payne v. Marion Gen.
Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 1043, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a physician has
a duty to obtain informed consent before implementing a DNR order); Lacey,
139 N.E.2d at 31 (requiring proper consent from a patient even where a beneficial or harmless operation is performed).
54. See Parkins v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 569, 574 (D. Conn. 1993)
("[Doctors] must disclose all the treatment options and the risks associated
therewith in order to ensure that the patient has sufficient information to make
an intelligent choice.").
55. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985) ("'Under this doctrine, no medical procedure may be performed without a patient's consent, obtained after explanation of the nature of the treatment, substantial risks, and
alternative therapies.'" (quoting Norman L. Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of
Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 237 (1973»); see also Law, supra note 1, at 285-88
(defining the right to self-determination and autonomy as characterizing the
doctrine of informed consent).
56. See Shultz, supra note 38, at 232 (''If the key issue is knowledge and
choice regarding the fate of one's body, there is no meaningful difference between a decision that will be implemented by touching the body and one that
will [not]."); see also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300-03 (Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that an adult of sound mind has the right, in the exercise of
control over his body, to determine whether or not to submit to medical treatment, and thus it follows that such a patient has the right to refuse any medical treatment even that which may save or prolong life); Payne, 549 N.E.2d at
1050 (holding that a physician has a duty to obtain informed consent before
implementing a DNR order). See generally Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen,
Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 610 (providing a doctrinal analysis of informed
consent). In addition to the common law right to refuse treatment, a limited
right for competent patients to refuse treatment exists under state statutes. See
infra note 97 and accompanying text.
57. Several cases have discussed the right to privacy and presented constitutional support for the right to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Rasmussen v.
Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 681-82 (Ariz. 1987) (en bane); Bartling v. Superior
Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984); Severns v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., 425
A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en bane); In re
Browning, 543 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647 (N.J. 1976); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). For a thor-
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eludes the patient's choice to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, is well accepted today in certain contexts.58 The jurisprudence
that has developed is a mixture of common law, statutes, and federal and state constitutional glosses.59 From these sources of law,
culminating \vith Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,60 the first "right to die" case to come before the United
States Supreme Court, the existence of a fundamental legal right to
make choices about one's medical treatment is now firmly established. 61

A.

Supreme Court Recognition of the Right to Refuse Treatment
In the 1990 decision, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health,62 the United States Supreme Court, for the first time,
found a constitutional dimension to the right to refuse medical
treatment and held that the constitutional right to liberty is implicated by providing medical treatment without the patient's consent.63

ough discussion of the right to die decisions, see Rebecca Morgan & Barbara
Harty-Golder, Constitutional Development of Judicial Criteria in Right-to-Die
Cases: From Brain Dead to Persistent Vegetative State, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
721 (1988).
58. There were at least 84 appellate decisions addressing the right to die
issued prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan. See George J. Annas,
The "Right to Die" in America: Sloganeering from Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill
and Kevorkian, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 875, 882 (1996); see also Cruzan v. Harmon,
760 S.W.2d 408, 412 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (listing 54 reported decisions from
1976 to 1988).
In a number of the earlier cases, the courts denied the right of a patient to
refuse treatment and ordered that treatment be administered against the patient's e~'Pressed wishes. See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, Inc.,
331 F.2d 1000, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp.
752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965). However, the clear trend emerging from more recent
case law is that the patient's right to refuse treatment, even life-saving treatment, will be upheld. See In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410-11 (N.J. 1987).
59. Some states recognize a right to refuse treatment based on a liberty or
privacy interest. See, e.g., Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 682 (privacy interest); In re
Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (same); In re Lawrence,
579 N.E.2d 32, 39 (Ind. 1991) (liberty interest). The Supreme Court has recognized that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest,
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, in refusing unwanted medical treatment, including life-sustaining treatment. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). Thus, following Cruzan, it is clear that patients have a liberty interest in refusing resuscitation. Whether this liberty interest is violated, however, is determined by weighing the liberty interest
against the relevant state interests. See id. at 279.
60. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
61. See MARGARET OTLOWSKI, VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA AND THE COl\ThION
LAw 35-44 (1997); Alan Meisel, A Retrospective on Cruzan, 20 LAw MEn. &
HEALTH CARE 340, 342 (1992).
62. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
63. Id. at 278-79. The United States Supreme Court stated:
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In 1983, Nancy Cruzan suffered severe and irreversible brain
damage in a car accident. 64 Although doctors aggressively treated
Ms. Cruzan, she was ultimately diagnosed as being in a persistent
vegetative state-"a condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function."o5
After six years without any sign of recovery, Ms. Cruzan's parents
asked the state hospital to discontinue life support and allow her to
die. 66 The hospital refused the request without a judicial order supporting such an action.67 Although Ms. Cruzan's parents obtained a
court order from the state probate court permitting the discontinuation of life-sustaining treatment,68 the Missouri Supreme Court
overturned the order.69 The state supreme court determined that
life-sustaining treatment could be removed only on clear and convincing evidence of the patient's desire to have the particular
treatment in question removed under the circumstances faced by
the patient. 70 The Cruzans petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for review. 71
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the
Missouri requirement of "clear and convincing evidence" that the
patient would want life-sustaining treatment discontinued before
permitting termination of such care did not violate the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution. 72 First, the Court recognized that one of the primary means of protecting the notion of bodily integrity is the informed consent doctrine. 73 As a result, the majority decided that the ''logical corollary of the doctrine of informed
This is the first case in which we have been squarely presented
with the issue whether the United States Constitution grants what is
in common parlance referred to as a "right to die."
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, \vithout due process of law."
The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may
be inferred from our prior decisions.
Id. at 277-78 (citations omitted).
64. See id. at 265.
65. Id. at 266.
66. See id. at 267.
67. See id. at 268.
68. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,411-12 (Mo. 1988) (en bane),
affd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
69. See id. at 427.
70. See id. at 419.
71. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 492 U.S. 917 (1989)
(granting petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court).
72. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280-82. The Supreme Court found that "a
State may properly decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a
particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in
the preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual." Id. at 282.
73. See id. at 269.
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consent is that the patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment.',u The Cruzan Court observed
that "most courts have based a right to refuse treatment either
solely on the common law right to informed consent or on both the
common law right and a constitutional privacy right.,,75 Here, the
Court dismissed the notion that the constitutional right of privacy
includes a right to refuse treatment, and instead stated that the issue is more properly analyzed in terms of Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest. 76 All nine Justices agreed on the existence of this
liberty interest, disagreeing only on how it should be balanced with
the state's expressed interests in the protection and preservation of
human life.77

74. Id. at 270. Several earlier state court decisions had based their recognition of the "right to die" solely on the common law. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 (Ct. App. 1983); In re Estate of Longeway,
549 N.E.2d 292,297 (TIL 1989); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947,951 (Me. 1987); In
re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 422-23 (N.J. 1987); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70 (N.Y.
1981).
Among the prior decisions discussed in the majority opinion were several
cases which held that patients have an interest in refusing to submit to specific
medical procedures. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)
(holding that Washington's procedures for administrating anti-physchotic
medication to prisoners were sufficient to satisfy due process concerns, but
stating that "[t]he forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's
body represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty"); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27-33 (1905) (balancing an individual's interest in declining smallpox vaccine against the state's interest in preventing
disease).
75. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271.
76. See id. at 271, 278; cf. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555 (1997) (arguing that bodily integrity should be
conceptualized as a fundamental property right rather than a liberty interest).
77. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. The fact that the four dissenters and Justice
O'Connor all explicitly recognized that there is such a protected constitutional
interest has led some to say that the Cruzan case was the first to find a constitutional right to die. This contention extends the majority opinion beyond its
explicit terms. See BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAw § 17-3, at 694 (1995)
(noting that the majority rejected a right to die and focused instead on a right
to refuse treatment). In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated:
I agree that a protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions and that
the refusal of artificially delivered food and water is encompassed
within that liberty interest.
Requiring a competent adult to endure [procedures for artificial
hydration and nutrition] against her \vill burdens the patient's liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine the course of her own treatment. Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal
decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery
of food and water.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287,289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The majority balanced Ms. Cruzan's right to refuse medical
treatment against the state's interest in the protection and preservation of human life. 78 The Court determined that Missouri had
permissibly sought to advance its interests by adopting "a clear and
convincing evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian
seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed
to be in a persistent vegetative state.'>79 It reasoned that imposition
of this procedural requirement was justified both by the importance
of the rights involved and by the appropriateness of placing the risk
of error on those attempting to terminate treatment, as an erroneous decision to withdraw treatment is more permanent than an erroneous decision not to withdraw treatment.so
The notion that the state has an interest in the preservation of
human life independent of the patient's own interests led Justice
BrennanB1 and Justice Stevens82 to write spirited dissents. Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, rejected the
clear and convincing evidence standard as unduly burdensome on

78. Although a patient does have a liberty interest in the right to refuse
medical treatment, see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278, this right is not absolute according to the Court, see id. at 279. The state's asserted interests were "the
protection and preservation of human life," id. at 280, and the safeguarding of
personal choice on the decision to refuse life support, see id. at 281.
The interests most commonly asserted by states in right-to-die cases are:
"(1) [T]he preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent
third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession." Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977) (distilling these four interests
from other cases). The court in McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990),
identified a fifth state interest: "[E]ncouraging the charitable and humane care
of those whose lives may be artificially extended under conditions which have
the prospect of providing at least a modicum of qualify living." Id. at 621.
The courts balance the states' interests against the patients' right to refuse
treatment, irrespective of whether the patient bases the right to refuse treatment on informed consent, liberty interest, or both. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486
A2d 1209, 1221-22 (N.J. 1985) (right to refuse treatment based on informed
consent); Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 71 (right to refuse treatment based on Constitution); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (right to refuse
treatment based on informed consent and the Constitution).
79. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284.
80. See id. at 283.
81. See id. at 301 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Stevens
opined that the Constitution required the "State to care for Nancy Cruzan's life
in a way that gives appropriate respect to her own best interests." Id. at 331
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He concluded that the "best interests of the individual, especially when buttressed by the interests of all related third parties,
must prevail over any general state policy that simply ignores those interests."
Id. at 350 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Missouri had only an "abstract, undifferentiated interest in the preservation of lifer,]" Ms. Cruzan's best interests
would allow a decision to terminate nutrition and hydration. Id. at 331
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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patients and their families. 83 In dissent, Justice Brennan asserted
that the majority had undervalued the liberty interest at stake and
had given too much deference to the state interest, permitting the
state to develop procedural law inconsistent with the effective exercise of the right to forgo life-sustaining treatment. 84 "[T]he State
has no legitimate general interest in someone's life, completely abstracted from the interest of the person living that life, that could
outweigh the person's choice to avoid medical treatment.',ss
Justice Brennan contended that a state could not interfere with
an individual's fundamental right to forgo unwanted medical treatment unless the state employed means narrowly tailored to a sufficiently important state interest.86 Although he recognized that Missouri had a legitimate state interest in Ms. Cruzan's welfare,
Justice Brennan refused to recognize that this included a generalized interest in the protection oflife.87 Likewise, Justice Stevens observed:
However commendable may be the State's interest in human
life, it cannot pursue that interest by appropriating Nancy
Cruzan's life as a symbol for its own purposes. Lives do not
exist in abstraction from persons, and to pretend otherwise is

83. See id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also DWORKIN, supra note
19, at 216-17 (suggesting that the alleged intrinsic value of prolonging somebody's life cannot justify the government's preventing him or her from meeting
death sooner if he or she reasonably prefer that course, and arguing that personal autonomy prevails if its exercise would not offend any rights or interest,
but only detached values).
84. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (''Missouri and
this Court have displaced [the patient's] own assessment of the processes associated with dying. They have discarded evidence of her ,vill, ignored her values,
and deprived her of the right to a decision as closely approximating her own
choice as humanly possible.").
85. ld. at 313 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Disagreeing with the evidentiary
standard as adopted and applied in the case, Justice Brennan addressed the
claim that the state was justified in its allocation of the "risk of error" in a way
that favored "the status quo," stating:
An erroneous decision [that is, one that did not reflect the patient's
true ,vishes] to terminate artificial nutrition and hydration, to be
sure, ,villlead to failure of that last remnant of physiological life, the
brain stem, and result in complete brain death. An erroneous decision not to terminate life support, however, robs a patient of the very
qualities protected by the right to avoid unwanted medical treatment.
His own degraded existence is perpetuated; his family's suffering is
protracted; the memory he leaves behind becomes more and more distorted. Even a later decision to grant him his wish cannot undo the
intervening harm.
ld. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 388 (1978)).
87. See id. at 313 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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not to honor but to desecrate the State's responsibility for pro-

· lifie.88
t ect mg

Although the Court recognized that the right to refuse treatment was not absolute, the Cruzan majority emphasized the important autonomy interest at stake in personal decisions concerning
medical care and required the government to have some justification for burdening that decision-making.89
Cruzan strongly supports the proposition that the state and
federal courts should robustly protect the right to refuse medical
treatment, even if they are not constitutionally obliged to do SO.90 In
fact, during the post-Cruzan era, virtually all courts have affirmed

88. Id. at 356-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens further added
that such a position is both "patently unconstitutional" and "dangerous" because it would allow states to prefer death for the incompetent in the same way
that Missouri prefers life. Id. at 354 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Because the state of Missouri was paying for Ms. Cruzan's care, and
did not dispute its ability to do so, the Court never addressed whether the cost
of the care was a relevant consideration. As one commentator has noted:
The decision does not explain whether the person paying for the care
... has any special status in determining what treatment should be
provided. As a consequence, it does not determine whether a patient's
family might be required to pay for extremely costly care believed to
be entirely repugnant, but which the state requires as a matter of
state law. In addition, the Cruzan decision does not determine
whether a state may discontinue treatment of some patients, or
choose not to commence it initially, because the state ,vi shes not to
pay for that treatment.
FuRROWETAL., supra note 77, § 17-2, at 692.
90. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Cruzan Court, conceded: "The
principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. He repeatedly framed the protected interest
as one in refusing treatment, and stated that it was "the forced administration
of ... treatment" that implicated the interest. Id. at 279.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence similarly stated that "the liberty interest
in refusing medical treatment flows from decisions involving the State's invasions into the body. Because our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined
,vith our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often
deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to the . . . Due Process
Clause." Id. at 287-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan, in dissent, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
also emphasized a "fundamental right to be free of unwanted" treatment. Id. at
302 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He found an individual has "a right to evaluate
... treatment ... and ... [decide] whether to subject oneself to the intrusion."
Id. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Likewise, Justice Stevens' dissent emphasized, too, that at stake was
"[h]ighly invasive treatment." Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting). His broader
language about "the liberty to make ... choices constitutive of private life," id.
at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and his assertion that "[c]hoices about death
touch the core of liberty," id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting), is married to language on "rights pertaining to bodily integrity" and the right to be free from
"physically invasive" procedures, id. at 342 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the right of competent and incompetent patients to terminate medical treatment.91
B. Further Recognition of the Right to Refuse Medical TreatmentThe Legislative Response
The publicity and concern generated by the Cruzan case
brought public focus to the inadequacy of protection for the right to
refuse treatment.92 In response, Congress and state legislatures
passed a variety of laws. 93 In 1990, the same year Cruzan was decided, Congress enacted the Patient Self Determination Act
(''PSDA''),94 a federal law requiring every hospital and nursing home
to provide information about advance directives to all patients upon
admission. 95 The PSDA further required institutions to develop
policies addressing advance directives and to notify patients of the
substance of these policies. 96
State legislatures also began passing laws to help safeguard the
right to refuse medical treatment. 97 Today, all states and the Dis91. For a discussion of courts' recognition of the right to terminate medical
treatment, see Larry Gostin, Life and Death Choices After Cruzan, 19 LAw MED.
& HEALTH CARE 9 (1991), L. Gregory Pawlson, Impact of the Cruzan Decision on
Medical Practice, 19 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 69 (1991), and Fenella Rouse,
Advance Directives: Where Are We Heading After Cruzan?, 18 LAw MED. &
HEALTH CARE 353 (1990).
92. See Elizabeth McCloskey, Between Isolation and Intrusion: The Patient
Self-Determination Act, 19 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 80, 81 (1991).
93. For a comprehensive account of practices and laws governing the forgoing of life-sustaining treatment and surrogate decision-making, see 2 MEISEL,
supra note 7, §§ 14.1-.10, at 349-69.
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(f), 1396a(w) (1994) (requiring health care providers
participating in Medicaid or Medicare programs to inform competent adult patients, no matter what their reason for admission, about state laws on advance
directives and to record any advance directives the patients may have). For
further information on the PSDA, see, for example, McCloskey, supra note 92,
and Margot L. White & John C. Fletcher, The Patient Self Determination Act:
On Balance, More Help Than Hindrance, 266 JAMA 410 (1991).
95. See White & Fletcher, supra note 94"at 410.
96. Specifically, the PSDA requires that health care providers "maintain
written policies and procedures" applicable to "all adult individuals receiving
medical care" concerning "an individual's rights under State [statutory and
common] law " . to make decisions concerning such medical care, including
the right to accept or refuse ... treatment and the right to formulate advance
directives." 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(f)(I)(A)(i), 1396a(w)(I)(A)(i). Furthermore, at
the time of admission to the health care facility, providers must give patients
written information about their own policies concerning such directives. See
Kelly C. Mulholland, Protecting the Right to Die: The Patient Self-Determination
Act of 1990, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 609, 610 (1991). Although the PSDA does
not create any substantive rights concerning medical decision-making, it recognizes that such rights exist independent of the Act, and more specifically that
state law has created and acknowledged the existence of such rights. See id. at
628.
97. See 2 MEISEL, supra note 7, § 10.12, at 27 n.l00 (collecting statutes); id.
at 29 n.l07 (collecting cases); Adam A. Milani, Better Off Dead Than Disabled?:

HeinOnline -- 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1053 1998

1054

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

trict of Columbia have recognized the right to refuse treatment
through the enactment of a variety of natural death statutes, including living will laws, 98 durable power of attorney for health care
laws,99 do not resuscitate ("DNR") order laws/oo and health care surrogate laws. IOI In addition, medical organizations, such as the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations
("JCAHO") now require that health care facilities create a mechanism to assist patients in the development of advance directives. 102
Should Courts Recognize a "Wrongful Living" Cause of Action When Doctors
Fail to Honor Patients' Advance Directives?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149, 228
n.48 (1997) (providing a list of state living will and advance directive statutes);
see also Charles P. Sabatino, Death in the Legislature: Inventing Legal Tools for
Autonomy, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 309, 313 (1991-1992) (discussing
typical advance directive statutes).
98. Living wills are a misnomer in that they have nothing to do with donative transfers at death. Living wills are documents in which individuals state
whether they desire life-sustaining treatment during the final stages of life,
and if so, which treatments can be provided and under what circumstances.
See David Orentlicher, The Limitations of Legislation, 53 MD. L. REV. 1255,
1258 (1994). Generally living will statutes apply only to patients who are terminally ill or permanently unconscious and limit the patients' treatment withdrawal orders to artificial nutrition and hydration. See id. at 1259; see also
Gregory Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 737,
796-97 (stating that many such statutes were enacted in states that already
created the same rights by judicial decision and the statutes merely provided a
procedure for channeling these rights).
99. The durable power of attorney in health care statutes allow a patient to
appoint an individual to make medical decisions on the patient's behalf in the
event that the patient is unable to make medical decisions for his or herself.
See Orentlicher, supra 98, at 1259.
100. DNR statutes allow patients to state that they do not want to receive
cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") if they suffer cardiac arrest. See id. at
1260. CPR can be defined as measures "to restore cardiac function or to support ventilation in the event of a cardiac or respiratory arrest." N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAw § 2961(4) (McKinney 1993). These statutes limit the patient's
treatment withdrawal orders to one kind of treatment, CPR. See Orentlicher,
supra note 98, at 1260.
101. Health care surrogate laws give authority to family members and
friends to make end-of-life decisions for permanently unconscious patients. See
Orentlicher, supra note 98, at 1260-61. Patients can combine a living will and
a durable power of attorney appointment. See id. at 1259. The patient instructs the appointed surrogate to follow the patient's instructions regarding
treatment. See id. If the instructions in the living will fail to give enough
guidance to the surrogate, the surrogate has the authority to make his or her
best judgment concerning the patient's preferences. See id. These statutes often apply to patients with any medical condition and are less likely to restrict
the types of treatments that the surrogate can order to be withdrawn. See id.
at 1260. See generally Colleen M. O'Connor, Statutory Surrogate Consent Pro·
visions: An Overview and Analysis, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
128 (1996) (analyzing issues common to many surrogate consent provisions).
102. See 1 JOINT COMMN ON ACCREDITATION OF Hosps., 1994 ACCREDITATION
MANuAL FOR HOSPITALS 157 (1993); see also AMERICAN MED. AsS'N, CURRENT
OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS § 2.19 (1986) ("The
preference of the individual should prevail when determining whether extraor-
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The JCAHO designed directives such as living wills to give physicians information about an individual's treatment preferences.lo3
All of the statutes and regulations demonstrate acceptance by a
majority of the public of the right to refuse treatment.
One primary failing of these statutes is that most people, for
understandable reasons, fail to complete formal advance directives. lo4 A recent study estimates that between ten and twenty-five
percent of the adult population in the United States has completed
formal advance directives (with some estimates as low as five percent).I05 Additionally, as noted earlier, even if a patient is one of the
few who has completed an advance directive, no guarantee exists
that the doctor will obey the directive. lOS Indeed, some commentadinary life-prolonging measures should be undertaken in the event of terminal
illness.").
103. To be accredited by the JCAHO, a health care institution must have a
mechanism for facilitating the family or legal guardian's participation in making decisions for the patient throughout the course of treatment. See JCAHO
Requires Hospitals to Address Ethical Issues, 7 MED. ETHICS ADVISOR 121, 123
(1991). This mechanism might be an ethics committee or an ethics consultant.
See id. at 122; see also Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study of Advance Directives for Life-Sustaining Care, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 882, 886 (1991) (finding
that the presence of advance directives did not increase likelihood that an individual's treatment ,vishes would be followed); Rhoden, supra note 35, at 430
("The judiciary's reaction to those few cases in which patients or their families
have sued for damages for nonconsensual treatment represents another instance of the legal system's uncritical endorsement of the medical profession's
activist approach."). See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel,
Living Wills: Past, Present, and Future, 1 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 9, 10 (1990)
(discussing the history of the living ,vill).
104. See DAVID W. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND
DYING 277-78 (1981) (noting that most persons do not like to dwell on the prospect of their own death).
105. See HEALTH, EDuc. & HUMAN SERVS. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PuB. No. GAOIHEHS-95-135, PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT:
PROVIDERS OFFER INFORMATION ON ADVANCE DffiECTIVES BUT EFFECTIVENESS
UNCERTAIN 8 (1995). The GAO study also reported that only 9% of patients under age 30 had an advance directive, but 35% of those over age 75 had one. See
id. at 9; see also Elizabeth R. Gamble et al., Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior
of Elderly Persons Regarding Living Wills, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 277,
278-79 (1991) (finding that although 39 of 75 elderly persons knew about living
wills, none had executed one and only two had discussed their preference for
limiting treatment with their physician); Martha Terry & Steven Zweig, Prevalence of Advance Directives and Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders in Community Nursing Facilities, 3 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 141, 141 (1994) (reporting that in a study
of eight rural community nursing facilities, less than one-third of patients had
advance directives).
106. See OrentIicher, supra note 98, at 1281. To support his thesis that legislation has not changed physician behavior, OrentIicher cites several studies
that found physicians often overrode living wills when they disagreed with the
patients' choices, including providing undesired treatment when the physician
felt it was appropriate. Id. at 1281-83; see also Panagiota V. Caralis & Jeffrey
S. Hammond, Attitudes of Medical Students, Housestaff, and Faculty Physicians
Toward Euthanasia and Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment, 20 CRITICAL
CARE MED. 683, 686-90 (1992) (discussing findings that medical personnel are
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tors have noted that a financial incentive may keep certain peoplethose with health insurance-alive despite their wishes. lo7 Finally,
many of these statutes actually provide immunity to the physician
who fails to obey an individual's living will or advance directive.lOB
Thus, although these statutes buttress the ideal of patient autonomy, they do not adequately protect the patient's right to refuse
treatment, and they fail to provide an incentive for the medical profession to respect a patient's considered exercise of the right to refuse treatment. Thus, the statutes fail to address the real problemphysician ability to ignore a patient's wishes.

C.

Physician Responses to the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
Despite the general acceptance of the right to refuse medical
treatment shared by the public, the courts, and the legislatures, a
large disjunction exists between what the law requires and the actual practice in the health care community.I09 Commentators have
more likely to comply with passive euthanasia by failing to take action to prolong life, than with active euthanasia by taking deliberate action that causes
death); Danis et al., supra note 103, at 886-87 (noting that a continuing problem with living \vills is the umvillingness of many physicians to honor them).
The existence of physician resistance to living wills has also been a source
of concern for the nurses who work ,vith them. Two nursing journals have discussed nurses' responsibilities when physicians fail to honor patients' wishes.
See Barbara Springer Edwards, When a Living Will Is Ignored, AM. J. NURSING,
July 1994, at 64, 64-65; Cindy Hylton Rushton, Ask the Experts, CRITICAL CARE
NURSE, Feb. 1993, at 61, 61-62.
107. See generally Bobinski, supra note 50, at 301-09 (discussing the theories underlying the relationship between economic incentives and the behavior
of physicians); Alexander M. Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical
and Legal Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 708 (1986) (discussing the loss to physician autonomy under managed care); Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review,
and Financial Risk Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1,22-41 (1993) (discussing utilization review, financial risk-shifting, and effects of cost containment on quality
of care).
108. See Gelfand, supra note 98, at 771-72 (noting that legislation providing
for living wills frequently contains no penalty for physicians who do not honor
them); Maggie J. Randall Robb, Living Wills: The Right to Refuse LifeSustaining Medical Treatment-A Right Without A Remedy?, 23 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 169, 173-77 (1997) (discussing the various types of immunity provided to
physicians who fail to obey a patient's living will). In addition, all state living
will and health care proxy statutes confer some sort of immunity from civil or
criminal liability on health care providers who in good faith comply with a
properly executed living will or the instructions of a proxy acting in accordance
with the patient's wishes or in the patient's best interest. See id.
109. See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 35, at 420-29 (discussing the combination
of factors that influence doctors to intervene on behalf of life); Sidney H. Wanzer et al., Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly III Patients, 310 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 955, 956 (1984) ("The physician's schooling, residency training,
and professional oath emphasize positive actions to sustain and prolong
life ...."); see also JAMES F. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE? PATERNALISM IN
HEALTH CARE 162-72 (1982) (discussing the conflicts between patients and phy-
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examined this disjunction and have provided several reasons to explain physicians' reluctance to obey a patient's decision to exercise
his or her right to refuse medical treatment. no First, some commentators have argued that fear of liability111 affects physicians' willingness to follow advance directives which ask that life-sustaining
treatment be \vithheld. 1l2 In addition, some commentators have
noted that while physicians fear liability for failing to provide sufficient treatment, either no sanctions, or only mild sanctions, potentially apply to a physician who fails to abide by a patient's treatsicians that arise when patients refuse medical treatment); KATZ, supra note
11, at 183-84 (discussing the pervasiveness of medical uncertainty); Joel M.
Zinberg, Decisions for the Dying: An Empirical Study of Physicians' Responses
to Advance Directives, 13 VT. L. REV. 445, 472 (1989) (reporting that 85% of
California physicians surveyed knew no details about the state's living ,vill
statute).
110. See Zinberg, supra note 109, at 452. Zinberg, a physician and an attorney, interviewed 18 physicians in Vermont and 39 physicians in and around
Los Angeles concerning their experiences with, and understanding of, advance
directives. ld. He identified three reasons for physician failure to honor patients' advance directives regarding the ,vithholding of treatment: "(1) [F]ear of
liability; (2) the perception that directives interpose an unnecessary additional
control over, and interfere ,vith, the physicians' professional actions; and (3) the
perception that directives implicitly question the physicians' judgment of the
patients' best interest." ld. at 482.
111. See Renee M. Goetzler & Mark A. Moskowitz, Changes in Physician Attitudes Toward Limiting Care of Critically III Patients, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 1537, 1538 (1991) (finding that physicians were concerned about malpractice liability in deciding how to treat critically ill patients). The courts have
been clear that liability should not be a serious concern for physicians and others who participate in a decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment if they act
reasonably and in good faith. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 415-16 (N.J.
1987) ("[N]o civil or criminal liability ,vill be incurred by any person who, in
good faith reliance on the procedures established in this opinion, ,vithdraws
life-sustaining treatment at the request of an informed and competent patient
who has undergone the required independent medical examination described
above.").
112. Physicians fear liability from ,vithdrawing treatment even though
there has never been a successful suit or prosecution against a physician or
faculty member for removing treatment in accordance ,vith the instructions of
the patient or the instruction of the family. See Alexander Morgan Capron, Legal and Ethical Problems in Decisions for Death, 14 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE
141, 142 (1986) ("If patients behaved as irrationally about treatment as physicians do about liability, the patients would be labeled incompetent."); Alan
Meisel, Legal Myths About Terminating Life Support, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 1497, 1497-98 (1991) (stating that the small number oflawsuits brought
involving termination of life support have all been resolved in favor of the physician); David Orentlicher, The Right to Die After Cruzan, 264 JAMA 2444,
2446 (1990) ("No person has ever been found liable for ,vithdra,ving lifesustaining treatment ,vithout court permission."); Robert F. Weir & Larry
Gostin, Decisions to Abate Life-Sustaining Treatment for Nonautonomous Patients: Ethical Standards and Legal Liability for Physicians after Cruzan, 264
JAMA 1846, 1852 (1990) ("Every court of final decision in every jurisdiction
that has addressed the question of physician liability . . . has found physicians
participating in the cases to be free from civil or criminal sanctions.").
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ment decision. ll3 Others have further speculated that physicians'
failure to abide by refusal of treatment decisions reflects a basic
reluctance to abandon the paternalistic model of decision-making. 114
The commentators state that many physicians simply do not
want to allow their patients to share actively in decision-making, or
do not trust the patients to make these choices because the physicians believe that medical training and expertise should be required
for every treatment decision. 115 In addition, many physicians mor113. See Orentlicher, supra note 98, at 1293; Ben A. Rich, The Values History: A New Standard of Care, 40 EMORY L.J. 1109, 1117 (1991). For example,
many advance directive statutes have severe penalties, including felony convictions, for those who might falsify or destroy a living ,vill, but the actions of a
physician who refuses to follow the terms of a patient's living will (or to refer
the patient to another physician who is ,villing to comply,vith the directive) are
only designated to be unprofessional conduct potentially subject to sanction by
the State Medical Board. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-113 (1997). Although every state and the District of Columbia have enacted Natural Death
Acts, only approximately seventeen states have any sanctions against physicians for a violation of a Natural Death Act, and of those, approximately six
provide that the physician may be civilly or criminally liable. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 18.12.070(a) (Michie 1996); ARK. CODEANN. § 20-17-209(a) (Michie 1991
& Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-206(1) (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3211-108(a) (1984 & Supp. 1997).
114. Hard paternalism accepts the proposition that it is morally justifiable
for others to protect competent adults, against their will, from the harmful consequences of their fully voluntary choices. See Rich, supra note 113, at 1118
n.34. Joel Zinberg also reports:
One interviewee volunteered that a substantial number of his colleagues dislike directives because they believe directives would curtail
doctors' control of treatment. This observation is partially confirmed
by the fact that many interviewees strongly opposed the interposition
of formal ethics committees. Only three interviewees in each state
agreed that other physicians or an ethics committee should be consulted.
Zinberg, supra note 109, at 482-83 (citations omitted). See generally KATZ, supra note 11 (explaining that hard paternalism is causing resistance to patient
efforts to exercise some degree of autonomy in decisions about their medical
treatment). For a detailed analysis of this type of physician behavior and the
implications for patient autonomy, see David Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient Choice in End-of-Life Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101 (1992), and Ben A. Rich,
The Assault on Privacy in Health Care Decisionmaking, 68 DENY. U. L. REV. 1
(1991).
115. Research studies have concluded that a significant number of physicians question the ability of patients to make decisions at the end of life. See,
e.g., Kent W. Davidson et al., Physicians' Attitudes on Advance Directives, 262
JAMA 2415, 2416 tb1.3 (1989) (indicating that 58.8% of responding doctors
strongly agreed that "[a] potential problem ,vith advance directives is that patients could change their minds about 'heroic' treatment after becoming terminally ill," and 32.4% strongly agreed that "[t]he training and experience ofphysicians gives them greater authority than patients in decisions about
,vithholding 'heroic' treatment").
Certain members of society receive less respect for their decisions regarding medical treatment than others. Specifically, in assessing terminally ill patients' wishes to die, women's views are considered less credible. See Lisa C.
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ally believe that they should not be engaged in helping people die. us
However, as several legal commentators have observed, lifesustaining treatment decisions are value-based and do not require
medical knowledge. ll7

Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in the Forced Medical
Treatment of Pregnant Women, 59 TENN. L. REV. 487, 507 n.112 (1992). Professor Ikemoto quotes a study of appellate decisions in right to die cases that
uncovered the following differences in the treatment of men and women:
"The first difference is the courts' view that a man's opinions are rational and a woman's remarks are unreflective, emotional, or immature. Second, women's moral agency in relation to medical decisions
is often not recognized. Third, courts apply evidentiary standards differently to evidence about men's and women's preferences. Fourth,
life-support dependent men are seen as subjected to medical assault;
women are seen as vulnerable to medical neglect."
Id. (quoting Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender and "The Right
to Die," 18 LAw iVIED. & HEALTH CARE 85, 87 (1989)); see also JOHN M. Sl\flTH,
WOMEN AND DOCTORS 9 (1992) (observing that whether it is "unnecessary surgery, inappropriate treatment or testing, lack of preventive care, lack of consideration in research, allocation of dollars, or simply being milked for dollars by
physicians, women[,]" regardless of their race, wealth, or career, are abused by
doctors more often than similarly situated men); Law, supra note 1, at 295
("[T]he tradition of medical paternalism is particularly strong in relation to
women patients; doctors often assume authority to determine what is in
women's best interest without soliciting their views."); Lisa Napoli, The Doctrine of Informed Consent and Women: The Achievement of Equal Value and
Equal Exercise of Autonomy, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 335, 338-39 (1996)
("Historically, e:l>.'Periments and operations have been performed on women
without their consent. When consent is sought, women must often overcome
gender-based stereotypes that impact on a doctor's decision to perform a procedure ...."). See generazz,y Black-White Disparities in Health Care, 263 JAMA
2344 (1990) (discussing disparities in the treatment of blacks and whites); Gender Disparities in Clinical Decision Making, 266 JAMA 559 (1991) (discussing
disparities in the treatment of men and women).
116. The literature is saturated with discussions on the moral aspects of
helping people die. See Andrew Benton, Personal Autonomy and Physician Assisted Suicide: The Appropriate Response to a Modern Ethical Dilemma, 20
Omo N.U. L. REv. 769, 778-86 (1994); Yale Kamisar, The Reasons So Many
People Support Physician-Assisted Suicide-And Why These Reasons Are Not
Convincing, 12 ISSUES L. MED. 113 (1996); Alan A. Stone, The Right to Die: New
Problems for Law and Medicine and PSYchiatry, 37 EMORY L.J. 627 (1988);
Eugenie Anne Gifford, Comment, Artes Moriendi: Active Euthanasia and the
Art of Dying, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1554-58 (1993).
117. See Orentlicher, supra note 98, at 1293; see also Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Ct. App. 1986). The court in Bouvia stated that:
Elizabeth Bouvia's decision to forego medical treatment or lifesupport through a mechanical means belongs to her. It is not a medical decision for her physicians to make. Neither is it a legal question
whose soundness is to be resolved by lawyers or judges. It is not a
conditional right subject to approval by ethics committees or courts of
law. It is a moral and philosophical decision that, being a competent
adult, is her's [sic] alone.
Id.
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Thus, from the viewpoint of a patient, or the patient's family,
the right to refuse medical treatment is easily ignored. us Broad judicial proclamations and state statutory protections have failed to
guarantee patients an effective right to medical self-determination.

II.

AsSESSING THE FAlLURE TO REMEDY BREACHES OF PATIENTS'
TREATMENT REFUSALS

Because of the medical profession'S failure to honor consistently
the right to refuse treatment, patients have been kept alive against
their wishes. At the same time, however, it has been very difficult
for patients to recover damages for the violation of that right. ll9 As
noted earlier, a significant incentive for physician compliance with a
patients' right to decisional autonomy has been the fear of litigation. 120 Various forms of tort law, including battery, medical malpractice, and the doctrine of informed consent (rather than administrative enforcement), have been the favored methods of enforcing
patient treatment decisions. 121
Although complaints alleging violation of the right to refuse
treatment are in all other respects ordinary tort actions,122 they pose
a problem with regard to the issues of injury and damages. 123 Dam118. Realizing the difficulty of having a patients right to refuse treatment
respected, some commentators have suggested some rather creative measures
so that physicians will be unable to ignore the patients' request. See, e.g.,
Marian Haglund Juhl, A Tattoo in Time: I Want My Last Wish To Be Clearly
Visible So It Will Be Honored by the Doctor Who Treats Me, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 13,
1997, at 19, 19 (suggesting a DNR tattoo be placed on the body so that physicians cannot ignore a patients' \vishes).
119. See Gasner, supra note 15, at 499 (stating, in 1992, that to date, no final monetary judgment had ever been awarded).
120. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Oddi, supra
note 35, at 634 (recognizing that physicians may be civilly or criminally liable if
they withhold treatment); Rhoden, supra note 35, at 420, 422-23 (discussing
how the fear of liability may effect medical decision-making). But cf. Hackleman, supra note 35, at 1362-63 (arguing that Ohio physicians disregard patient
advance directives because Ohio law provides sanctions only when they act in
bad faith and provides loopholes for those physicians who are prosecuted).
121. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990)
(finding that the "notion of bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement that informed consent is generally required for medical treatment," and
that informed consent is a component of American tort law). In his dissent, Justice Brennan remarked that the right "to determine what shall be done with
one's own body" is grounded in American tort law. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. For a discussion of theories advanced in cases seeking damages for
failure to honor a patient's refusal of treatment, see Gasner, supra note 15, at
504-12, and Addlestone, supra note 15, at 1267-72.
123. On the issue of damages, the plaintiff must allege that had the health
care provided not been negligent nor \villful, the plaintiffs right to refuse
treatment would have been respected and the plaintiff would have died. See
Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ohio 1996).
Thus, the person's injury is in living. To conclude that a plaintiff suffered an
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ages in tort actions for violating the right must be based on the
premise-unacceptable to many courts-that in some circumstances
death is preferable to life, and that a life continued warrants damages. 124 A recent case demonstrates some of the difficulties that patients have in vindicating the right to refuse treatment.
In Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital,125 the Ohio Supreme Court held that "there is no cause of action for 'wrongfulliving''' against a hospital for failure to follow a patient's DNR order. 126
In Anderson, Edward Winter, eighty-two, was admitted to the hospital in 1988, complaining of chest pain. 127 While in the hospital,
Mr. Winter discussed the type of treatment he was to receive with
his family doctor, Dr. Russo. 128 Dr. Russo understood Mr. Winter to
say that ''he wanted no extraordinary life-saving measures in the
event of further illness.,,129 Despite the fact that Dr. Russo recorded
"no code blue" on his chart,130 when Mr. Winter developed a potentially fatal irregular heart rhythm a nurse revived him by using a
cardiac defibrillator. 131 Mr. Winter survived the ventricular fibrillation, but two days later suffered a stroke that left him permanently

injury cognizable in tort, and to determine the measure of compensatory damages, the factfinder would have to compare the relative benefits of nonexistence
to a life with disabilities. Courts have deemed this task impossible, refusing to
make such calculations of injury (and the resulting valuations of life with and
without disabilities), and thus have denied the availability of wrongful living
suits to plaintiffs. See Hackleman, supra note 35, at 1369.
124. See, e.g., Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Colo. 1988) (en
bane) (concluding that "life, however impaired and regardless of any attendant
eA-penses, cannot rationally be said to be a detriment" when compared to the
alternative of nonexistence); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 389
(ill. 1983) (finding that human life cannot be a compensable harm, and stating
that "the benefit of life should not be outweighed by the expense of supporting
it"); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807,812 (N.Y. 1978) (finding courts unequipped to handle the task of comparing the value of life in an impaired state
and nonexistence).
125. 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
126. Id. at 228.
127. Id.
128. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., No. C-930819, 1995 WL
109128, at ':'1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1995), rev'd, 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
129. Id. During his conversation ,vith Dr. Russo, Mr. Winter was competent
and alert. See id. In addition, Mr. Winter's daughter "told Dr. Russo how such
[life-saving] measures had been given to Winter's wife, which resulted in great
misery and suffering for the remainder of her life." Id. While she was in intensive care, Mr. Winter's ,vife had "had her heart shocked and her chest beat and
that Winter was very upset about those actions." Id. at *1 n.l. Winter subsequently told his daughter '''never to let anybody do that to him.'" Id.
130. Id. at ':'1. In his deposition testimony, Dr. Russo defined a "no code
blue" order as "an organized process of resuscitating a patient and anything
that would initiate that or any procedure that would be, that would occur during that process would be a resuscitative procedure, whether you whap them on
the chest or whether you give medicine or whether you give an IV." Id.
131. See id.
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paralyzed on his right side. 132 Mr. Winter incurred significant medical expenses for the constant medical attention that he required before his death nearly two years later.133 Mr. Winter's estate alleged
battery, negligence, and wrongful living claims,134 asserting that by
keeping Mr. Winter alive, the hospital caused him pain, suffering,
emotional distress, disability, and medical damages, as well as
other expenses. 13S
Chief Justice Moyer, writing for a majority of the Ohio Supreme
Court, concluded from the facts that Mr. Winter had not suffered a
compensable injury from the hospital's failure to follow his treatment request. 13G In his decision, Justice Moyer did not question Mr.
Winter's right to make the treatment decision or his competency to
do so. On the contrary, the court noted the constitutional significance of his right to make such a decision. 137 Justice Moyer stated:
The plaintiff asserts a right to enforce an informed, competent
decision to reject life-saving treatment. This claim is inextricably linked to, and arises directly out of, the right to die recognized in Cruzan . ... Thus, in a "wrongful living" action, the
plaintiff is asserting a liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment. It is the denial of this liberty interest,
when the medical professional either negligently or intentionally disregards the express wishes of a patient, that gives rise
to the wrongful living cause of action. 138
The court, however, concluded that Ohio did not recognize a tort
claim for wrongfulliving. 139 Rather than examining Mr. Winter's

132. See id. After his stroke, Mr. Winter, although aware of what was going
on, "was unable to walk, was incontinent of urine, had difficulty speaking, and
needed assistance in bathing and dressing." Id.
133. See id. at *2.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ohio
1996).
137. See id. at 227 (noting that in a wrongful living action the plaintiff is asserting a constitutional liberty interest in refusing medical treatment).
138. Id.
139. See id. at 228. The wrongful living cause of action was first coined by
A. Samuel Oddi. Oddi, supra note 35, at 637-43. The tort is essentially a battery or negligence claim associated with doctors who perform life-sustaining
treatment against the \vishes of a patient. See id. at 644. The wrongful living
claim should be distinguished from claims for wrongful life, wrongful birth, and
wrongful pregnancy. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227.
A wrongful life claim is brought by a child seeking damages against a
health care provider for negligently failing to inform the parents of a possible
hereditary defect, see Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 955 (Cal. 1982) (en banc),
or for failure to properly sterilize a parent, see Johnson v. University Hosp., 540
N.E.2d 1370, 1372 (Ohio 1989). A wrongful birth claim is brought by parents of
an impaired child. WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
441 (8th ed. 1998). Wrongful pregnancy deals specially with the failure of ei-
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autonomy interest, the court focused on the difficulty of determining
damages under a wrongful living cause of action, stating that
"[t]here is perhaps no issue that better demonstrates the outer
bounds of liability in the American civil justice system than this issue.,,140
In determining if damages should be awarded for the lifeprolonging treatment, Justice Moyer stated that the issue presented
was whether '''continued living' [is] a compensable injury.,,141 The
court held that life is not a compensable injury/42 even if the plaintiff could show a breach of a duty resulting in prolongation of life. 143
The court noted that it had previously recognized the "'impossibility
of a jury placing a price tag' on the benefit of life,,144 and concluded
that: "There are some mistakes, indeed even breaches of duty or
technical assaults, that people make in this life that affect the lives
of others for which there simply should be no monetary compensa. ,,145
t IOn.
ther a birth control method or a sterilization procedure that led to the birth of
an unwanted, albeit healthy, child. See Johnson, 540 N.E.2d at 1372.
140. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228 (noting that damages, if any, must be
based on a theory of negligence or battery). In rejecting the wrongful living
tort, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision to allow
recovery for all foreseeable consequences of the treatment, including pain, suffering, and emotional distress beyond that which Winter would have suffered
had he not been resuscitated. See id. The difficulty in comparing death to a life
with disabilities arises in the "wrongful life" suits as well. See Barry R. Furrow, Impaired Children and Tort Remedies: The Emergence of a Consensus, 11
LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 148, 152 (1983); Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Toward
Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injures and Wro%aful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1456.
141. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227. In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas stated:
[If one] [a]ppl[ied] the positive connotation to an act which continues life, where death would have occurred without intervention,
what damage could possibly ensue?
... Assuming, for purposes of argument only, that the action of
the hospital through its staff was negligence and, assuming further,
that "damages" should be assessed as a result of the negligence, how
could they be computed? Can the preservation oflife (furthering life)
even be amenable to the "damages" concept. I think not!
Id. at 229 (Douglas, J., concurring).
142. See id. at 228. Overall, it appears that the court did not believe that
Mr. Winter had suffered any cognizable injury from the wrongful resuscitation.
143. See id. One could apply this reasoning to a person who interferes with
the right to have an abortion. Indeed, in that case, the argument is stronger
because the life saved is of one who did not assert a right to die.
144. Id. (quoting Johnson, 540 N.E.2d at 1378). Even the court's language
reflects complete disregard for patient choice; life is a "benefit," regardless of
the patient's view of the matter.
145. Id. For a critique of the view that an individual does not suffer harm
by being kept alive against his will, see 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL LAw: HARM TO OTHERS 91 (1984), which argues that it is reasonable to believe a person may be harmed by something even if he is unaware of
it, like a man who does not know his wife is having an affair.
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Justice Moyer then examined the possibility that Mr. Winter
might have a claim based upon theories of negligence or battery.146
He concluded, however, that causation was lacking for both a negligence and a battery claim. 147 In reaching this conclusion, the court
applied an extremely narrow version of the ''but for" causation
test,148 finding that the defibrillation did not cause Mr. Winter's
subsequent stroke. 149 Even though the record indicated that Mr.
Winter would have died without resuscitation and that a stroke was
a foreseeable event,150 the court held that "the record is devoid of
any evidence that the administering of the resuscitative measures
caused the stroke."l5l
Not surprisingly, the court also narrowly interpreted the battery claim to provide compensatory damages only if the patient had
suffered physical harm. 152 Because Mr. Winter had suffered no
physical damage due to defibrillation, "i.e., no tissue burns or broken bones,,,153 and because his estate had conceded that it was not
seeking nominal damages,154 the court concluded that there was no
issue for the trial court to decide on remand and entered judgment
for the hospital. 155

146. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227.
147. See id. at 229. For a discussion of how courts will often confuse the
concepts of valuation and causation in tort cases involving preexisting conditions, see Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal

Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90
YALE L.J. 1353, 1353-64 (1981).
148. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227. Under an ordinary tort analysis, application of the "but for" test in a case where a doctor ignores a DNR order is
straightforward. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the doctor's actions
proximately caused the subsequent injury. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St.
George Hosp., No. C-930819, 1995 WL 109128, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15,
1995) (holding that a patient is entitled to compensation for foreseeable injuries
proximately caused by the unwanted medical treatment), rev'd, 671 N.E.2d 225
(Ohio 1996). The appropriate test should be that but for the resuscitation, the
injury would not have occurred. Without intervention from the doctors, the patient would have died and would not have been subjected to the pain and loss of
dignity associated ,vith her medical condition. See id. These conditions are
foreseeable.
149. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 229.
150. See id. at 228.
151. Id. ("Winter suffered the stroke because the nurse enabled him to survive the ventricular tachycardia. Because the nurse prolonged Winter's life,
numerous injuries occurring after resuscitation might be foreseeable, but would
not be caused by the defibrillation.").
152. See id. at 229. The court reasoned that Mr. Winter did not suffer a battery because any nonconsensual medical treatment the nurse performed was
physically harmless. See id. The courts unduly narrow definition of harm results from its failure to find any harm from continued living. See id. at 228.
153. Id. at 229.
154. See id.
155. See id.
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In addressing whether the lack of a remedy would have a detrimental impact on the important right to refuse medical treatment,
Justice Moyer noted that this decision should not encourage unwanted life-saving treatment:
Where a patient clearly delimits the medical measures he or
she is willing to undergo, and a health care provider disregards such instructions, the consequences for that breach
would include the damages arising from any battery inflicted
on the patient, as well as appropriate licensing sanctions
against the medical professionals. 156
Three judges dissented and argued that Winter's estate should
have been given an opportunity to prove that the hospital was negligent and that the health care providers violated Mr. Winter's constitutional rights. 157 The dissenters specifically argued that,
"[c]ontrary to the assertion of the majority opinion, the plaintiff was
not seeking to recover because Winter's life was prolonged. He was
seeking to recover because the hospital staff failed to follow the instructions Winter had given them.,,158 Furthermore, the dissent
noted that Mr. Winter's estate might be able to prove that the hospital's negligence increased the likelihood that he would suffer a
stroke,159 and that his estate had sufficient evidence to survive
summary judgment. 16o An expert witness had offered to testify that
a stroke was immediately foreseeable if resuscitation occurred. 161
Therefore, the dissent asserted, the majority incorrectly granted
162
summary judgment in favor ofthe defendant hospital.
The Anderson court never explicitly questioned Winter's right
to make the DNR decision or his competency to do so, nor did it examine the appropriateness of the hospital authorities' determinations. 16) Rather, the court focused on the difficulty or inappropri156. ld. at 229. Chief Justice Moyer apparently ignored the fact that under
the Anderson holding, the court failed to provide any remedy.
157. See id. at 230 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
158. ld. (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
159. See id. (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (noting that Mr. Winter's experts should
have been given an opportunity to testify about causation because a factual
dispute existed about what had caused his stroke).
160. See id. (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
161. See id. (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) ("Medical experts were prepared to testify on behalf of [Mr. Winter's estate] that 'it was medically foreseeable that he
[Mr. Winter] would suffer a stroke during the days immediately following defibrillation.'").
162. See id. (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
163. Indeed, the appellate court had specifically found that there could have
been a violation of Mr. Winter's right and believed that, if such a violation was
found, the only issue left to determine was whether the resuscitation caused his
harm. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., No. C-930819, 1995 WL
109128, at :::3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1995), rev'd, 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
The court stated, ''To be more precise, Edward Winter gave express directives
for his medical care which were ignored, either negligently or intentionally.
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ateness of assigning a dollar amount for this type of harm,l64 at least
partly because of the view that life is always preferable to death. As
a result, the court thus undermined Winter's fundamental right.
Mr. Winter's case reveals the fatal flaw inherent in the right to
refuse treatment. Anderson illustrates that failing to provide a
remedy for the right to refuse medical treatment renders that right
almost a complete nullity.165 If physicians are given the power to
administer life-saving or life-sustaining medical care, despite a patient's express refusal of that treatment within an advance directive, then the physician could subject the individual to any number
of various medical treatments without consent. 166
The court's deference results from its failure to fullyacknowledge the scope and importance of the individual autonomy interest
involved. 167 People make the decision to refuse or accept lifesustaining medical treatment for many reasons. Some want to
avoid the final agony of a terminal illness; others want to press on,
despite pain or disability, for myriad reasons. 168 Some people may
have religious views for rejecting or accepting life-sustaining treat-

His right to refuse treatment was expressly violated." Id. The Ohio Supreme
Court never disputed this finding. Rather, it reversed the appellate court based
on its bizarre application of the causation rules to Mr. Winter's case, resulting
in the plaintiffs failure to show any connection between the defibrillation and
Winter's subsequent stroke. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228.
164. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228.
165. See Rhoden, supra note 35, at 430 (arguing that the judiciary's unresponsiveness to wrongful living suits reflects "the legal system's uncritical endorsement" of the medical profession and its reluctance to sanction the medical
profession's interventionist instincts).
166. Taking this argument to its logical end, an individual would have no
cause of action even if the medical provider maliciously refused to withdraw
treatment. Why should the law allow for such an abuse of medical authority on
the sanctity of human life, particularly when the rest of society must account
for similar conduct in other contexts, and may even be called on to support the
individual's existence? The consequences of this argument are unreasonable.
See, e.g., United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965)
(holding that physicians could provide blood transfusions to a hospitalized patient who was refusing them on religious grounds and concluding that "[t]he
patient may knmvingly decline treatment, but he may not demand mistreatment").
It is hard to imagine a case in which a patient's refusal of medical treatment that is necessary to save his life would not come within the court's definition of mistreatment. See SMITH, supra note 115, at 19 (noting that doctors
have been granted tremendous power by society, including, perhaps, most importantly, the power to control the "flow of information").
167. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
("[C]hoices central to personal dignity and autonomy ... [that] define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life ... [also] define the attributes of personhood ...."); Michael H. v. Gerald
n, 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that in our system of government, "'liberty' must include the freedom not to conform").
168. See Rakowski, supra note 32, at 2094.
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ment, or strong philosophical beliefs. 169 Others reject life because of
the conditions on which it is offered: either in chronic and uncontrolled pain, in helpless dependence on other people, or in other
ways considered degrading. 170 "Of course, people often have reasons
other than self-interest for not wanting to live as long as
[technologically] possible,,17l-they fear becoming an unnecessary
burden on their family or friends, or perhaps they want to leave a
larger estate. l72 Also present is some notion of dignity or selfrespect. 173 "None of us," as Ronald Dworkin says, "wants to end our
lives out of character.,,174
Part of the courts' deference to physicians appears to stem from
a misplaced appreciation of the strong incentives already· existing
within the medical profession that support continued treatment of
169. See id.
170. See id. at 2094. Some of these fears, as noted above, are well justified.
Physicians do ignore the documented wishes of patients and all too often allow
patients to live with uncontrolled pain. See A Controlled Trial to Improve Care
for Seriously III Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and
Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA
1591, 1591-92 (1995). Studies of cancer patients have shown that over 50% suffer from unrelieved pain. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND LAw,
WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: AsSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL
CONTEXT at x-xi (1994). The New York Task Force also reports that "[d]espite
dramatic advances in pain management, the delivery of pain relief is grossly
inadequate in clinical practice.... Studies have shown that only 20 to 60 percent of cancer pain, is treated adequately." Id. at 43.
171. Rakowsld, supra note 32, at 2094.
172. See id. at 2094-95; see also Gasner, supra note 15, at 514 (''Permitting
payment for unwanted treatment provides a serious disincentive to honor patient choice. . . . If the provider is allowed to treat now, and decide later
whether it was appropriate, and get paid in the interim, there is little incentive
to expedite the court proceedings.").
173. See Rakowsld, supra note 32, at 2095. Professor Meisel makes the
point that the proclivity of the courts in treatment refusal cases to assert the
state interest in an adversarial fashion against the liberty interest of the individual erroneously suggests that the state has no concern for the autonomy,
self-determination, privacy, and bodily integrity of its citizens. 2 MEISEL, supra
note 7, § 8.14, at 502. Personal dignity is a part of one's right of privacy. The
right of bodily privacy led the United States Supreme Court to hold that it
shocked its conscience to learn that a state, even temporarily, had put a tube
into the stomach of a criminal defendant to recover swallowed narcotics. See
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
174. DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 213. Dworldn observes:
Decisions about life and death are the most important, the most crucial for forming and expressing personality, that anyone makes; we
think it crucial to get these decisions right, but also crucial to make
them in character, and for ourselves. Even people who want to impose their convictions on everyone else through the criminal law,
when they and like-minded colleagues are politically powerful, would
be horrified, perhaps to the point of revolution, if their political fortunes were reversed and they faced losing the freedom they are now
ready to deny others.
Id. at 239.
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the patient. 175 There is also the courts' discomfort with punishing a
physician for saving a life. 176 However, an unbalanced inquiry that
heeds only the rights of the medical profession does great harm to
patient autonomy interests. Because health care for end~of~life
treatment is expensive,177 claimants have tried to refuse payment to
nursing homes and hospitals when health care providers have ig~
nored their right to refuse treatment and thus have subsequently
accrued large medical bills. 178 As in Anderson, these claims have not
been successful.179 Monetary considerations/so current statutes, and
case law do not supply incentives for hospitals and doctors to pro~

175. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text; see also Danis et aI.,
supra note 13, at 884 (noting six instances where patients received more aggressive care than requested); Susan M. Wolf, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the
Context of Managed Care, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 455, 460-66 (1996) (reviewing the financial incentives for physicians to overtreat patients).
176. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 229
(Ohio 1996) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Short of ignoring a living will or a durable power of attorney for health care, medical professionals should not be subjected to liability for carrying out the very mission for which they have been
trained and for which they have taken an oath." (citations omitted».
177. See generally Katharine R. Levit et al., National Health Expenditures,
1993, 16 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 247 (1994) (providing data on health care ex~
penditures in the United States and noting, in particular, the high cost of endof-life care).
178. See, e.g., Grace Plaza, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 855 (App. Div.
1992). In Grace Plaza, a long-term care facility admitted Jean Elbaum in September, 1986, follo\ving hospital treatment for a stroke. Id. at 855. Approximately one year later, Mr. Elbaum informed Grace Plaza that his wife did not
want to live in her present state and he demanded her feeding tube be with~
drawn. See id. When Grace Plaza refused Mr. Elbaum's request, he stopped
paying and Grace Plaza sued to recover payment for services it had rendered to
Mrs. Elbaum. See id. In holding that Grace Plaza could recover, the court acknowledged that, "in light of our decision today, all health care providers in
charge of competent patients will have an additional financial incentive to prolong the lives of such patients over the objections of the patients' families." Id.
at 860. The court then stated:
This may be true, and the potential evil which we see is that some
beleaguered families may, regrettably, be forced to litigation . . . .
What is not noted is that, if Mr. Elbaum's conduct in this case were
condoned, health care providers would have an additional financial
incentive to obey, without question, the orders of those conservators
who might prematurely despair of their conservatee's recovery, or the
orders of those conservators whose judgment might be tainted by motives less altruistic than Mr. Elbaum's. The potential evil we see resulting from this, i.e., the possible death of even one patient whose
life might have been saved, is infinitely greater, in our view.
Id.
179. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228; see also Grace Plaza, 588 N.Y.S.2d at
860.
180. See Gilbert, supra note 10, at Al (quoting Dr. Bernard Lo, director of
the program of medical ethics at the University of California at San Francisco,
as stating that doctors have strong financial incentive to put patients in intensive care rather than talk with them about alternatives.)
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vide appropriate care to a patient who chooses to refuse medical
treatment. lSI As one dissenting judge put it, such rulings "allow[ ] a
nursing home to profit financially, while ignoring a patient's wishes,
as it imposes its own ethical standards upon her.,,182
To be sure, some judges have indicated dissatisfaction with the
lack of protection accorded the right to refuse treatment. 183 These
jurists, however, are in the minority.184 In most post-Cruzan decisions, courts, by denying a remedy, have effectively expanded the
discretion of hospital authorities to ignore the patient's right to refuse medical treatment. At least arguably, these decisions have reduced the right to refuse treatment to a mere catch-phrase.

III.

BEYOND THE CURRENT LAw: A NEW APPROACH

The prevailing judicial attitude does not adequately protect the
right to refuse medical treatment. A new approach is necessary to
ensure that in balancing the competing interests that underlie this
dilemma, more respect is accorded the patient's autonomy interests.

Autonomy Rights and Misguided Paternalism
Notably absent from current jurisprudence in this area is the
notion that protecting a patient's autonomy serves important social
and civic values. Autonomy is firmly grounded in the Constitution's

A.

181. See Wolf, supra note 175, at 457-58 (discussing how some commentators have remarked on the potential problems caused by the current system,
which favors treatment over nontreatment); see also Don Colburn, The Grace of
a "Good Death" Escapes Many; Despite Living Wills and Other Innovations, Doctors Often Ignore or Don't Know Patients' Wishes, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1995, at
Z7 (quoting Joanne Lynne, director of the Center to Improve Care of the Dying,
stating that one of the problems with the current system is that "it doesn't hold
itself accountable for badly handled deaths. 'If I, as a doctor, do it badly, nothing comes down on me .... I get paid well. The family is left behind in grief
and goes away. The patient's suffering counts for nothing.'").
182. Grace Plaza, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 862 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting)
(e}"'Pressing great concern that Grace Plaza had '''ignored Mr. Elbaum's demands while simultaneously insisting upon payment for their undesired services.'" (quoting Elbaum v. Grace Plaza, 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 847 (App. Div.
1989»)).
183. See, e.g., id. at 868 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) ("The advancement of
professional ethics to support the preservation of life has epitomized the medical profession, to the public benefit. However powerful those interests may be,
they should not serve as a platform to afford compensation for unwanted services, rendered adversely to the patient's declared right to autonomy."); Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 230 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (noting that the patient's administrator should have been allowed to show that the hospital failed to follow
the patient's instructions with regard to his medical care).
184. In case law, it is the dissenting judges who have indicated dissatisfaction with the lack of protection accorded patients who refuse treatment. See,
e.g., Grace Plaza, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 868 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting); Anderson,
671 N.E.2d at 230 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
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protection of individual liberty. ISS The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to provide protection for liberty interests
ranging from freedom of conscience and religion,186 to autonomy in
decisions affecting marriage, reproduction, and the raising of children. 187 The Court extrapolated from these liberty and autonomy
interests to support a constitutional right to withdraw life support.188
Judicial decisions involving the right to refuse medical treatment do not demonstrate respect for individual autonomy. 189
Rather, the decisions reflect a misguided paternalism on the part of
judges to allow doctors to extend life under almost any circumstances. Unfortunately, this view holds that the medical professional knows better than the patient, what is really in the patient's

185. The Supreme Court has frequently employed autonomy in constitutionaljurisprudence. For example, it recognized the autonomy of the individual
to choose the editorial content of publications in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153,
178 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring), to represent themselves in court in Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S 806, 817 (1975), and to control unwanted mail in Rowan
v. United States Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970). In all these
instances, the Court could have substituted liberty for autonomy without altering the import of these rights. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court
also used liberty and autonomy indistinguishably, claiming "[t]he woman's constitutional liberty interest also involves her freedom to decide matters of the
highest privacy and the most personal nature," and "[d]ecisional autonomy
must limit the State's power to inject into a woman's most personal deliberations its own view of what is best." 505 U.S. 833, 915-16 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In constitutional jurisprudence, both liberty and autonomy protect a
woman's right to make important personal decisions for herself. See id. at 920
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, the Court has
identified autonomy with liberty for many decades, and recently has employed
it to ground important personal rights.
186. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985) (reaffirming that individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the
right to select any religious faith or none at all); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that requiring school children to salute the flag "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit" protected by
the First Amendment).
187. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (privileging
"matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(protecting the right of parents "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(defining liberty to include the right to choose an occupation to "acquire useful
knowledge, to marry," and to raise children).
188. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[AJ protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions and ... the refusal
of artificially delivered food and water is encompassed within that liberty interest.").
189. See supra Part II.
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best interest. 19o Perhaps because the stakes are so high, the government intervenes on the side of the medical professional to ensure
that the individual does not make a horrible mistake.
This Article maintains that the medical profession should not
be trusted to make these fundamental choices for individuals. I91
The medical provider is not any wiser or more knowledgeable about
how a person chooses to exercise fundamental liberties than the
person him or herself. 192 Likewise, the government, including the
judiciary, should not automatically side with the doctor when making a determination in the right to die cases. Even though the legislatures and courts are often inept at determining what is truly in
a person's best interest,I93 they should not rely solely on the medical
profession to make that determination. There is a natural tendency
to belittle the costs we inflict on others in pursuing our values or interests. As Rochefoucauld warned, "[w]e are all strong enough to
endure the misfortunes of others.,,194 Permitting the medical profession to dictate decisions about fundamental liberty interests for the
majority of citizens violates individual autonomy.I9S
Moreover, because the right to refuse medical treatment is such
a deeply personal choice that implicates each person's philosophical
or religious views on life and death,I96 medical providers should not
190. See, e.g., Grace Plaza, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853,861-64 (App.
Div. 1992) (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (reasoning that in maintaining medical
treatment, Grace Plaza was not acting out of fear of liability because the patient's wishes were unclear; rather, it was imposing its own ethical beliefs on
the patient).
191. As Justice Brandeis observed: ''Experience should teach us to be most
on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent.... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
192. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 838, 920 (1992)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (''Part of the constitutionalliberty to choose is the equal dignity to which each of us is entitled.").
193. For example, the Court has upheld cases in which the judiciary has denied certain autonomy and moral choices to individuals. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding state-forced sterilization); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the separate but equal doctrine), overruled by
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393 (1856) (invalidating the congressional act freeing slaves in certain territories), superseded by U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.
194. DUKE DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, THE MA.,"{IMS OF THE DUKE DE LA
ROCHEFOUCAULD 'lI19, at 35 (Constitutine FitzGibbon trans. 1957).
195. See Philip G. Peters, The Illusion of Autonomy at the End of Life: Unconsented Life Support and the Wrongful Life Analogy, 45 UCLA L. REV. 673,
693 (1998) ("When unconsented care is administered, the patient, not the court,
suffers the agony of prolonged death, the impoverishment of further medical
and support expenses, and the frustration and indignity oflingering beyond her
time and burdening her family.").
196. See DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 215 (noting that the idea that ''human
life is sacred or inviolable is both more complex, and open to different and com-
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interfere and attempt to impose their own view regarding life's absolute sanctity. 197 Again, the courts must uphold the patients'
autonomy interests in cases in which doctors have ignored their
wishes. Instead, the courts have acted to uphold the values and
viewpoints of the medical profession. 19B Under the Constitution,
transient majorities may not impose their own moral choices on
others, absent a compelling governmental reason for doing so, if the
legislation implicates a fundamental liberty interest. 199 The Founders believed that government should not define popular morality or
displace the citizenry's ability to make moral decisions.20o Indeed,
the belief was that individuals would become better citizens if they
had the freedom to make difficult moral choices about how to live
their lives. 201 As Professor Martin Diamond suggests, the Founders
peting interpretations"); see also BEAUCHAMP & CmLDREsS, supra note 38, at
157 ("Any attempt to make life-understood as a set of vital logical processesunconditionally good in itself is a 'vitalism' that should be rejected in favor of a
view that life is only conditionally good."). As another commentator has aptly
recognized:
[L]ife is not merely a matter of being alive in some purely biological or
bio-physical sense of the term. Something can be alive or be capable
of life in the latter sense, yet not alive or capable of life in the sense
implied in or by the expressions mentioned above .... [AJ full life
... is one full of significant experience and activity, and we apply it in
the first instance only to human beings.
Henry David Aiken, Life and Right to Life, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN
GENETICS 173, 173 (Bruce Hilton et al. eds., 1973).
197. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 ("[T]he most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "[i]n a community such as ours, 'liberty' must include the freedom
not to conform").
198. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
199. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 ("Our obligation is to define the liberty of all,
not to mandate our own moral code.").
200. See Richard Hofstadter, The Founding Fathers: An Age of Realism, in
THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 73, 76 (Robert H. Horwitz
ed. 1977) ("One thing that the Fathers did not propose to do, because they
thought it impossible, was to change the nature of man to conform with a more
ideal system."); Kimberly Sharron Dunn, Note, The Prize and the Price of Indiuidual Agency: Another Perspectiue on Abortion and Liberal Gouernment, 1990
DUKE L.J. 81, 88 (noting that the original 13 colonies rejected the Aristolean
view of government and based the legitimacy of their revolution on a belief
taken from John Locke's political philosophy that "when political power inappropriately intrudes on individual liberty the people have the right to abolish
it"). For another discussion of the necessary role of the state in making people
more autonomous, see Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiuing Autonomy: Sources,
Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989).
201. See RUTH W. GRANT, JOHN LOCKE'S LmERALISIII 194 (1987) ("And to be
truly free, he must be guided by his own reason. It is not enough to do the reasonable thing. A man must have reached the conclusion on his own that it is
the reasonable thing to do."); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY 3-19 (Currin V.
Shields ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1956) (1859) (distinguishing between moral and
political power in the project of making human beings good, and carving out a
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were confident that at least among some people, "the full range of
the higher human virtues would have suitable opportunity to flourish ... from religion, education, family upbringing, and simply out
of the natural yearnings of human nature" but not by use of the
law. 202 Thus, the government generally should remain neutral to
competing views ofthe good or ofmorality.203
The pluralism of American society provides a third argument
against government paternalism.204 Because of the differing beliefs
that underlie each person's value system, it is essential that an individual's choice be respected.205 Decisions about when to die, just

large domain of individual liberty that should not be disturbed by coercion or
moral condemnation); see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19
(1990) ("We are aware that desecration of the flag is deeply offensive to many
. . . . [But p]unishing desecration of the flag dilutes the very freedom that
makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering."); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 419 (1989) (''The way to preserve the flag's special role is not to punish those who feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that
they are wrong.").
202. Martin Diamond, Ethics and Politics: The American Way, in THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 200, at 39, 71; see
also H.L..A. HART, LAw, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 58 (1963) ("[W]hat is valuable
here [in the domain of morality] is voluntary restraint, not submission to coercion, which seems quite empty of moral value."). There is very little evidence to
support the idea that morality is best taught by fear of legal punishment. Morality is certainly taught and sustained ,vithout legal punishment, and where
morality is taught ,vith it, there is the standing danger that fear of punishment
may remain the sole motive for conformity.
203. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985) ("[E]quality
supposes that political decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of
any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life. . . .
[T]he government does not treat [citizens] as equals if it prefers one conception
to another ...."); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALIS~1 191-94 (1993) (defining
the necessity of neutrality much more vigorously than Dworkin, as well as, offering a more philosophical understanding ofneutraIity).
204. See James Madison, Debates (June 12, 1788), in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at
328, 330 (Jonathan Elliot ed., William S. Hien & Co., 2d ed. 1996) (1891)
("[T]he utmost freedom. . . arises from that multiplicity of sects which pervades America, . . . for where there is such a variety of sects, there cannot be a
majority of anyone sect to oppress and persecute the rest."). Other writers
have added that the maintenance of multiple faiths is the best protection of the
core guarantee of liberty of conscience. See, e.g., ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE EsSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS: A SEASONABLE PLEA FOR THE
LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGl\IENT, IN MATTERS OF
RELIGION, WITHOUT ANY CONTROUL FROM HUMAN AUTHORITY 7 (n.p. 1744).
205. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 32 (James Madison) (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., Madison House 1989). Madison stated that in a
federalist republic:
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame ,vithin their particular States, but ,viII be unable to spread a general conflagration
through the other States: a religious sect, may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects
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as surely as decisions about conception,206 should often reside outside the domain of majoritarian legislative bodies.
Although medical professionals may have legitimate reasons for
rejecting a patient's decision to refuse medical treatment, this does
not justify abandoning the values and principles articulated in Cruzan207 and Casey.208 The medical profession should not be permitted
to act with impunity.209 Doctors and other care-givers should recognize that patients have the right to exercise choice in these matters,
and the courts should ensure that health care professionals respect
patients' values and preferences when making treatment decisions. 210
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of the paternalistic approach
reflected in the Anderson decision, a deferential approach towards
physicians has some support in the academic community. A number of scholars have argued that medical doctors must be given wide
latitude in their administration of a patient's care.211 They argue
that medical professionals are in the best position to judge what
care patients should receive and, therefore, should not be overly inhibited in exercising their discretion. 212 Defenders of the status quo
dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the national Councils
against any danger from that source ....
ld.
206. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reI. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(holding that the Constitution forbids a state from sterilizing certain criminals
not only because the proposed punishment would do "irreparable injury" to
bodily integrity, but because "[m]arriage and procreation" concern "the basic
civil rights of man").
207. 497 U.S 261 (1990); see supra Part LA.
208. 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d
1047, 1053 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (stating that carrying deference to a physician's best medical judgment to its extreme "could effectively nullify those privacy rights recognized in In re Quinlan," and permit a "physician [to] circumvent the express wishes of a terminal patient by waiting to act until the patient
was comatose and critical"). But see Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,
575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that moral opposition to nudity supplies a rational basis for permitting a state to prohibit it).
209. See Grace Plaza, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 860-61 (App. Div.
1992) (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) ("Grace Plaza is on record as having discounted utterly the patient's wishes to die naturally, proclaiming itself to be the
transcendent arbiter of the patient's artificial life support.").
210. Obviously, just as medical professionals should not be allowed to completely discount a patient's decision to accept or refuse medical treatment, not
all patient decisions should automatically receive protection from the courts.
For example, if a provider insists on treatment because the patient might get
better and the patient or the patient's family objects with no basis, this might
present a circumstance when a physician might be permitted to displace the
patient or his or her family as decision-maker. Instead, each patient's situation
should be evaluated on a fact-specific basis, providing balanced protection for
patient wishes.
211. See Milani, supra note 97, at 168 & n.85 (citing scholars who suggest
that physicians are in the best position to make decisions for patients).
212. See id.
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may argue that cases like Anderson provide needed flexibility to
health professionals, allowing them to best determine what care the
patient should receive. 213
On the other hand, several academicians have questioned the
minimal protection accorded to patients under the current test and
have put forth a variety of proposals for reform. Some commentators have advocated providing patients with new common law actions. 214 Others have suggested that legislative action may be the
only hope for increased protection of patient autonomy.215
213. See id.
214. See generally Gasner, supra note 15 (arguing for the need for a tort
remedy to impose financial penalties for the failure to respect a patient's right
to refuse treatment); Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 35 (arguing for a need for
a legal remedy if a patient's right to refuse treatment is violated); Milani, supra
note 97, at 223 n.348 (1997) (interpreting Willard Pedrick as "suggesting that
the use of tort principles will be more successful in assuring the right to die
than the enactment of statutes"); Miller, supra note 15 (arguing that courts
must give broader recognition to right-to-die damage actions); Oddi, supra note
35 (arguing for the need for a wrongful living tort to permit compensation for
violations of the right to refuse treatment); Willard H. Pedrick, Dignified Death
and the Law of Torts, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 387, 390 (1991) (noting that the
"familiar principles of tort law can be enlisted to better assure that unwanted
life support measures either will not be used, or will be ,vithdrawn when that is
the ,vish of the patient or the patient's agent"); Peters, supra note 195, at 731
(arguing that a right to compensatory damages will foster respect for patients'
wishes); Addlestone, supra note 15, at 1267-72 (noting that "[a]s a matter of
common sense, noncompliance with a patient's ,vishes should give rise to some
type of liability"); Richard P. Dooling, Comment, Damage Actions for Nonconsensual Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 895 (1986)
(arguing that a physician or hospital that fails to respect a patient's right to die
should be liable in damages); Hackleman, supra note 35 (noting the need for a
wrongful living cause of action if a patient's right to die is violated).
215. Several commentators have suggested that the Patient SelfDetermination Act ("PSDA") might give rise to a cause of action when a hospital fails to inform a patient of his rights under state law or of its policy regarding the removal of life support. See Gasner, supra note 15, at 518; Addlestone,
supra note 15, at 1278-79. But see Mulholland, supra note 96, at 627 n.81
(1991) (arguing that by delegating to health care providers the role of information distributor, and not information advocate, the PSDA eliminates the possibility of malpractice suits).
The only case to date on the issue, however, held that the PSDA does not
include a private right of action. See Asselin v. Shawnee Mission Med. Ctr.,
894 F. Supp. 1479, 1485 (D. Kan. 1995). Some states classify the failure of a
health care provider to comply with an advance directive, and to transfer a patient to a facility where treatment will be ,vithdrawn, as a criminal misdemeanor, but such a failure must be willful or in bad faith. See, e.g., ARK. CODE
.ANN. § 20-17-209(a) (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(a)
(Deering 1998); MONT. CODE.ANN. § 50-9-206(1) (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20411(1) (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. .ANN. § 449.660(1) (lVlichie 1996). Other states
classify the failure to comply with a directive as unprofessional conduct, allowing state licenSing authorities to penalize a health care provider. See, e.g., D.C.
CODE.ANN. § 6-2427(b) (1995); HAw. REv. STAT. § 327D-11(c) (1993); Mo . .ANN.
STAT. § 459.045(1) (West 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-78(a) (West 1996);
OKLA. STAT. .ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.11(a) (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.11-
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Many of these scholars have noted that fear of civil or criminal
actions for suspending treatment provides a strong incentive for
health care providers to resuscitate patients at all costS.21G Theyargue that a similar fear of legal liability for unwanted treatment
might counterbalance this effect because the only legally prudent
thing to do would be to act in good faith, consistent with the patient's wishes, and in accordance with good medical practice. 217
Thus, they assert that courts and legislatures should provide
greater protection for the individual autonomy interest. 21S

B.

Resuscitating the Right to Refuse Treatment
Plaintiffs bringing actions for a violation of the right to refuse
treatment have relied on a plethora of theories, ranging from intentional infliction of emotional distress to constitutional violations. 219

9(a) (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-100 (West 1976 & Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 32-11-108(a) (1984 & Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112(3)
(1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.07(1)(a)(3) (West 1997).
216. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision
Making for the Terminally III Incompetent, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 367, 386 nA8
(1979). A few living will statutes expressly provide the basis for a civil cause of
action, but either limit the damages available or require that the health care
provider's refusal to follow the advance directive be in bad faith. See ALAsKA
STAT. § 18.12.070(a) (Michie 1994) (allowing "civil penalty not to exceed $1000
plus the actual costs associated with the failure to comply with the order or
declaration, and this shall be the exclusive remedy at law"); NEB. REV. STAT. §
20-402(1) (1997) (''Unjustifiable violation of a patient's direction shall be a civil
cause of action maintainable by the patient or the patient's next of kin. Remedy in law and equity may be granted by a court of competent jurisdiction.");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108(a) (1984 & Supp. 1997) ("Any health care provider who fails to make good faith reasonable efforts to comply with the preceding procedure as prescribed by the attending physician shall be civilly liable
and subject to professional disciplinary action ....").
Additionally, section 10 of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act
("UHCDA") includes a provision on "statutory damages." UNIF. HEALTH-CARE
DECISIONS ACT § 10, 9 U.L..A. 309 (1988 & Supp. 1998). Damages are available
only for an intentional violation of the act and can range from $500 to "actual
damages resulting from the violation, whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorney's fees." Id. § 10(a). A comment to the section indicates that the drafters
chose civil damages rather than criminal penalties "out of a recognition that
prosecutions are unlikely to occur." Id. § 10 cmt. It also indicates that the
statutory damages "do not supersede but are in addition to remedies available
under other law." Id.
217. See Annas, supra note 216, at 386 nA8.
218. See id.
219. See, e.g., Ross v. Hilltop Rehab. Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528, 1530-31 (D.
Colo. 1987) (claiming civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a private cause of action under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Bouvia v.
County of Los Angeles, 241 Cal. Rptr. 239 (Ct. App. 1987) (claiming violation of
civil rights); Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct.
App. 1986) (pleading five damage theories including battery, violation of state
and federal constitutional rights, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction
of emotional distress and conspiracy); McVey v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 524
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Despite this, few complaints have been successful. 220 It appears that
the COurtS,221 and not existing tort law,222 have been the principal
roadblock to recovery. Courts have been reluctant to extend exist223
ing tort principles from other cases to this area.
Although many
decisions acknowledge the existence of these principles, courts have
not generally applied them in the same fashion as they would in
other personal injury cases. 224 This has occurred because the courts
A.2d 450, 452 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (claiming negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
A discussion of the § 1983 cause of action in the context of refusal of
treatment is outside the scope of this Article, but can be found in SHELDON H.
NAHMOD, CML RIGHTS AND CIVIL LmERTlEs LITIGATION: THE LAw OF SECTION
1983, 156-57 (3d ed. 1991).
220. See Gasner, supra note 15, at 499 (noting that no reported cases exist
in which damages have been awarded for the unwanted imposition of life-sustaining treatment).
221. Nancy Rhoden argues that the courts have adopted the medical presumption of continued treatment: "Although it may seem like folly to question
the near-sacrosanct medical and legal injunction to 'err on the side of life,'
... the medical presumption for treatment incorporates not only the overt and
noble commitment to saving life, but also covert and highly questionable psychological, technological, and professional drives." Rhoden, supra note 35, at
420. Rhoden describes the professional self-concept of physicians: ''Persons intensively socialized to be decisive, action-oriented healers may find it e},.'ttaordinarily difficult to refrain from taking action." Id. at 421.
Further, with the increased availability of technology that can have some
effect, the medical ethic more than ever includes an attitude that "it is always
better to over-diagnose and over-treat than to fail to intervene." Id. This sentiment, in turn, is supported by faith in medical power and fear of litigation.
See id. at 422-23. Therefore, the impact of technology itself on the practice of
medicine breeds a technological imperative. See id. at 423-27; see also Daniel
Callahan, Can We Return Death to Disease?, 19 HAsTINGS CENTER REp. supp. at
4 (1989) ("We will need a dampening of the push for medical progress, a return
to older traditions of caring as an alternative to curing, and a willingness to accept decline and death as part of the human condition (not a notable feature of
American medicine).").
222. See Peters, supra note 195, at 675 (arguing that a doctrinal difficulty
exists for courts adopting the wrongful living tort due to the development and
rejection of the prenatal tort remedy, wrongful life). But see, Hackleman, supra
note 35, at 1359 (arguing that wrongful life tort provides support for the further
development and adoption of the wrongful living tort).
223. See, e.g., Grace Plaza, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 860-61 (App.
Div. 1992) (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (stating that Grace Plaza completely ignored the patient's wishes, believing that it knew what was best for the patient). While courts have failed to provide a remedy, they have not been entirely forthcoming as to why the plaintiff does not deserve a recovery. Instead,
as noted above, the courts manipulate tort principles so that it appears the
plaintiff has no legal case. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of a judge's duty to make the reasoning behind his or her decisions
and assumptions in those decisions explicit, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist
Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829, 862-63 (1990).
224. For example, in Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital, 671
N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ohio 1996), the court applied an incorrect causation analysis
in order to find that the hospital's defibrillation did not cause Mr. Winter's injury. See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
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have discounted patients' right to refuse treatment225 and have
failed to find harm when the patients remain alive. 226 The courts'
timidity effectively renders the right to refuse treatment a nullity.
To be sure, potential liability acts as a strong incentive for the
medical profession to respect an individual patient's autonomy
rights. Perhaps new theories, such as the wrongful living tort,2~7
will be used to vindicate patients for the violation of this right. Like
its predecessors, however, a new tort theory will do nothing if courts
are not willing to implement fully the tort principles that already
exist in the medical area.
As noted above, courts appear to take questionable positions
concerning the autonomy interest involved and the power of the
medical profession.228 Some courts may object to remedying a denial
of the right to refuse treatment based on a religious belief that life is
the gift of a higher power, and thus individuals have no right to dispose oftheir lives.229 In addition, courts may be reluctant to provide
a remedy when they are unsure that the individual properly exercised the right to refuse treatment.230 This last concern, however,
confuses the required procedural protections that may be necessary
to protect all patients from overly cost-conscious health care provid-

225. See, e.g., Grace Plaza, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 861-64 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (reasoning that in maintaining medical treatment, Grace Plaza was not
acting out of fear of liability because the patient's wishes were unclear; rather,
it was imposing its own ethical beliefs on the patient).
226. See, e.g., Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 229 (holding that the prolongation of
life cannot be a legal detriment).
227. For commentators who argue for the acceptance of a wrongful living
cause of action, see, for example, Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 35, at 261-63,
Oddi, supra note 35, and Hackleman, supra note 35.
228. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
229. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT 375 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1963) (1690) (arguing that the will of God is the preservation of mankind and that human sanctions are not valid against this); PAUL
RAMsEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL INTERSECTIONS 146
(1978) (characterizing life as a gift from God, a perception based on the JudeoChristian heritage that has influenced medicine toward a pro-life stance, and
that choosing any course of action or inaction that results in death would be to
throw the gift of life back in the face of the giver). But see Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 563-72 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (asserting that a state's religious reasons for a law are
inappropriate considerations).
230. Courts have legitimate fears that some patients might be killed against
their \vishes or that some patients might be coerced into consenting to the removal of care. See Yale Kamisar, On the Meaning and Impact of PhysicianAssisted Suicide Cases, 82 MlNN L. REV. 895, 906 (1998) (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287-92 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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ers231 with the legal remedy that should be provided to any patient
who properly exercises her right and is ignored.

1. The protection offundamentalliberties
A review of other fundamental rights shows that courts have
upheld the protection of individual liberties and autonomy rights,
even when they disagree with how the individual exercises those
rights or see potentially harmful consequences following such an
exercise. 232 For example, imagine the case of a woman who goes to
her doctor and requests an abortion. If the doctor, because of a
moral objection to abortion, deceived the woman into believing that
an abortion would endanger her life, surely the woman would have
a cause of action for malpractice or fraud. 233 This would be true
even though the doctor may have been right in the sense that, after
the fact, the new mother proves to be quite happy to have the child.
In the abortion context, the physician is not permitted to overrule a
patient's decision, even if the physician feels the patient's decision
.
ally wrong. 234
IS mor
The right to vote belongs to all individuals.235 An individual can
vote for whomever he or she pleases, even if a person votes for a
candidate who objectively does not appear to serve his or her best
interests.236 Similarly, we protect freedom of speech even though it

231. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280 (upholding the imposition of a clear and
convincing evidence standard as a legitimate procedural protection on the right
to refuse medical treatment).
232. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("We cannot lose
sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal
values are truly implicated.").
233. See, e.g., McCandless v. State, 162 N.Y.S.2d 570, 575-76 (App. Div.
1957) (awarding $2000 in damages for an abortion performed on mental patient
,vithout her consent, though pain was less than labor would have been and
mental condition was improved as a result of abortion).
234. See Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant
Women: "Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest", 37 HAsTINGS L.J.
703, 724 (1986); Nancy K Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, 1990-94 (1986).
235. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (recognizing the right to
vote as fundamental and as one of those rights that is "preservative of other basic civil and political rights"); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1919)
(holding that the right to vote "is so valuable that damages are presumed from
the wrongful deprivation of it").
236. For example, suppose that Kathleen Willey, a women who has publicly
stated that President Clinton sexually assaulted her, voted for him in the 1996
Presidential election. Knowingly voting for a person whom you believe has attempted to take advantage of you might appear to be irrational and wrong.
However, no government official judges a person's vote and determines whether
it is in his or her best interest.
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may lead to violence,237 and we protect freedom of religion even
though some will join cults.238
Thus, even when courts disagree with the manner in which
people exercise some of their most valuable rights, and view the exercise as harmful, the courts do not limit the individual's ability to
make these choices. Nor do courts withhold a meaningful remedy
from persons denied these rights. Part of an individual's autonomy
interest is the ability to make what, with twenty-twenty hindsight,
proves to be a poor, or even wrong, decision. 239 Obviously, the consequences of making an incorrect choice with regard to the right to
refuse medical treatment are tremendous. A necessary incident of
freedom and individual liberty, however, is permitting individuals
to make mistakes, even life and death mistakes.

2. Applying tort principles
Application of basic tort principles to remedy a violation of the
right to refuse medical treatment is straightforward if one respects
the autonomy interests at stake. A battery action for unauthorized
medical treatment has existed for many years. The Cruzan Court
noted its potential availability as a remedy for violation of a patient's right to refuse medical treatment. 240 A physician who knowingly ignores a patient's advance directive would be liable for battery and should be subject to damages for the harm caused by the
wrongful resuscitation or failure to obey the patient's desire for
treatment to be withdrawn.241 Depending on the jurisdiction, the
237. See, e.g., DOUGLAS A. HIBBS, JR., MAss POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A CROSSNATIONAL CAUSAL ANALYSIS 8 (1973) (commenting that unpopular political
speeches have caused riots in which people have died); WILLIAM W. VAN
ALsTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 34-35, 107 n.38 (1984)
(citing several Supreme Court political speech cases to support the theory that
extreme and offensive speech is valuable because of its ability to grab attention
and force debate on difficult issues).
238. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (setting forth the
general test to be applied in First Amendment free exercise challenges). See
generally, Leon Wieseltier, Strait Was the Gate, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 21, 1997,
at 42 (discussing the Heaven's Gate cult and the death of its members who believed that they would find their maker on a comet).
239. See DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 222. Although the contribution that
autonomy gives to the value of a person's life is undisputed, it is a separate
question whether that value is enhanced by a liberty interest to make immoral
or wrong choices. Joseph Raz argues forcefully that in many cases it is not.
JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 380-81, 410-12 (1986).
240. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990)
(discussing the common law view that a physician's nonconsensual touching
may constitute a battery).
241. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., No. C-930819, 1995 WL
109128, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1995), rev'd, 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
This holding was reversed on appeal because of a failure to show any connection between the defibrillation and Winter's subsequent stroke. See Anderson,
671 N.E.2d at 228; see also Marcus L. Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Con-
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plaintiff may have to show that she has suffered harm to recover
compensatory damages,242 but should be entitled to nominal damages and even punitive damages without such proof.243 Some jurisdictions will presume harm and award damages even though no
physical harm has been shown.244 Under either analysis, the damages resulting from battery when a patient specifically has asked
not to be resuscitated should include all future medical expenses: If
the patient had not been resuscitated, she would not be alive to incur these expenses. 245 Even if no evidence exists that the resuscitation caused the subsequent medical problems, by definition, those
problems can be said to have resulted from the health care provider's actions. In addition, the plaintiff should be permitted to recover for any costs related to end-of-life care, emotional damages
(including the deprivation of the right to make a refusal of treatment choice and the pain and suffering of the current illness), and
perhaps even the continued anguish and indignity of remaining
alive but grossly impaired without hope ofrecovery.246
sent", 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 666 (1968) (stating that in order to recover
damages the plaintiff only need show that what was done was substantially different from that to which consent was given); Leonard L. Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking For the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L. FORUM 580, 583-84 (stating that in
medical informed consent cases, the "plaintiff may recover damages for the
wrongful touching, for all injuries flowing from the touching, and if the court or
jury considers it appropriate, for punitive damages").
242. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAw OF REMEDIES, § 7.3(2), at 305 (2d ed.
1993) (discussing torts, such as battery, and noting that some jurisdictions
permit recovery of presumed damages in situations where one of these torts has
been committed but little or no economic or physical harm results); see, e.g.,
Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 110 S.E.2d 716,724 CWo Va. 1959) ("[D]amage flows
from the wrongful act, itself injurious to another's rights, although no perceptible loss or harm accrues therefrom ....").
243. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 242, § 7.3(2), at 305 (discussing that some jurisdictions do not use the presumed damages rule and, thus, may leave the
plaintiff without a substantial recovery, but that these jurisdictions generally
will emphasize other immeasurable damages, such as emotional distress or punitive damages, to ensure a full recovery).
244. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1977) (holding that
students who were deprived of their procedural due process rights may collect
nominal sums in the absence of proof of damages); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F.
64, 66 (8th Cir. 1919) (noting that substantial damages are presumed in voting
rights cases); Lamb v. Cartwright, 393 F. Supp. 1081, 1085 (E.D. Tex. 1975)
(allowing recovery for unlawful arrest); Miles v. F.E.R.M. Enters., 627 P.2d 564,
568 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that in a civil rights action for race discrimination damages are presumed).
245. To prove compensatory damages in a battery action, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that "but for" the defendant's tortious conduct, she would not have
suffered the harm or offense. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 44, § 41, at 205.
246. Likewise, if a health care provider negligently fails to respect a patient's right to refuse treatment, he or she should be held liable if the patient
can prove the elements of a negligence cause of action. See, e.g., WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 18, at 102 (4th ed. 1971) (stating
that a doctor is liable if he acts without the consent of the patient or a court order). In a negligence case, the analysis requires the identification of a duty and
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Once courts accept that prolonging life against a person's
wishes is a harm, proving damages should not be difficult. As noted
above, in many jurisdictions, under either a battery or negligence
cause of action, plaintiffs must provide proof of their injuries relating to harm allegedly caused by prolonging an individual's life
against his or her will in order to receive compensation. 247 This system is imperfect like any system that attempts to compensate human injury with money.248 Some deserving plaintiffs may be denied
recovery because they cannot prove that their harm is real. Other
plaintiffs may be overcompensated in the imprecise process of attaching a monetary value to mental anguish and the loss of dignity.
This proof of harm requirement should satisfy those who are worried about speculative damages and the potential harm to the medical profession from the risk of huge liability awards. Moreover, requiring proof of damages or harm helps to weed out unmeritorious
cases at an early stage. If the plaintiffs cannot plead specifically the
type of harm they have suffered, they may have failed to state a
cause of action and their suit should be dismissed. 249 In addition,
providing proof of injury provides appellate courts with a record
against which they can independently evaluate the merits of any
award.250 Rather than speculate about possible damages, or the lack
breach of that duty, as well as proof of causation and damages. See Menifee v.
Ohio Welding Prods., 472 N.E.2d 707,710 (Ohio 1984).
A breach of duty arises when a health care provider negligently interferes
with a person's right to refuse medical treatment. Consider first the factual
scenario in Anderson where the nurse negligently failed to read the plaintiff's
DNR order on his medical chart. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 226. A reasonable
person employed as a nurse should be familiar with a patient's chart; thus, the
nurse has a duty to read the chart. Once the nurse should have known of the
patient's wish to refuse life-sustaining treatment, the nurse's duty shifts to
abide by the patient's wishes. Her negligence in resuscitating the plaintiff constitutes a breach of that duty.
Furthermore, causation and damages should not be complicated to assess.
As Professor Oddi stated when describing a negligence cause of action for the
right to refuse treatment, "the loss to the patient asserting the right to die is
the prolongation oflife. Expressed in terms of causation, the question becomes:
But for the. . . interference with the right to die, that is, the rendering of
treatment, was the life of the patient prolonged?" Oddi, supra note 35, at 661.
Thus, the measure of damages should be reflective of how long the life was
prolonged after the time when death would be expected to occur had no treatment been rendered. See id. See generally CHARLES T. McComnCK, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES 260-74 (1935) (discussing the standard of proximate
cause in torts).
247. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
248. Cf. Friedman, supra note 22, at 741-42 (asserting that the familiar notion that money can make someone whole is somewhat dubious where physical
injuries are concerned).
249. See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 678-79 (E.D. Ark. 1998)
(dismissing Paula Jones' sex discrimination and outrage claims for failure to
show harm from alleged unwelcome sexual advances from the then-Governor of
Arkansas).
250. See Miller, supra note 15, at 189.

HeinOnline -- 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1082 1998

1998]

BEYOND MISGUIDED PATERNALISM

1083

thereof, appellate courts will have proof of actual damages and thus
be unable to impose their vie'VIloint of what damages should be
awarded.
Awarding financial damages in these cases would better balance the power relationship among the patient, family, and health
care provider.251 In addition, in a traditional tort action for battery,
plaintiffs are entitled to a trial by jury.252 The public abhorrence of
such over-treatment of patients, and the widespread public fear of
being kept alive against one's ,viti, are likely to make the possibility
of trial by jury extremely unattractive to the medical profession. 253
Thus, in contrast to the current approach that denies a tort recovery for violations of the right to refuse medical treatment,254
courts should apply basic tort principles ,vithout flinching at the
fact that a person has chosen death over an undesirable existence.
For example, in Estate of Leach v. Shapiro,255 the court held that
Ms. Leach's estate could recover on the basis of a battery theory for
her "'Tongful resuscitation. 256 The court analogized the case to other
battery cases and treated Ms. Leach's claim like all other medical
batteries.257
251. See Peters, supra note 195, at 693 (arguing that providing compensation to the plaintiff can ensure greater protection of the plaintiffs right to refuse treatment); Stephanie S. Gold, Note, An Equality Approach to Wrongful
Birth Statutes, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1005, 1011 (1996) (noting that the denial of
a patient's right to sue and collect damages for the wrongful birth tort relives
the doctor from "the threat of liability and the corollary burden of full disclosure").
252. See Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 35, at 270-71 (discussing the benefits to the plaintiff of a trial by jury in a wrongful living cause of action).
253. The recent acquittals of Jack Kevorkian demonstrate the public'S belief
that the law does not reflect the importance of end-of-life decisions. In 1994
and 1996, Michigan juries acquitted Jack Kevorkian for his participation in assisted suicides of terminally ill individuals. See Kelly L. Anderson, Kevorkian
Acquitted for the Second Time, AsSOCIATED PREss, Mar. 8, 1996, available in
1996 WL 4415582 (discussing Kevorkian's second acquittal); David Margolick,
Kevorkian's Trial Has Come to an End but Debate on Assisted Suicide Hasn't,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1994, at A16 (commenting that Jack Kevorkian was acquitted by a Michigan jury of charges that he illegally assisted the suicides of terminally ill individuals because jury members determined that he had not intended the deaths but only that he intended to relive pain and suffering).
254. See supra Part ILB.
255. 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing potential of recovery
for non-consensual administration of life-sustaining treatment). In Leach, Ms.
Leach's estate sued after hospital personnel placed her on a respirator without
her or her family's consent follo\ving an in-hospital resuscitation which resulted
in her being left in a chronic vegetative state. [d. at 1052. In reversing the
lower court's dismissal of the claim, the appellate court concluded that a patient may recover for violation of her right to refuse medial treatment. See id.
256. Id. at 1052.
257. See id. at 1052-53. Although the appellate court permitted Ms. Leach's
estate to bring her claim, the trial court dismissed the patient's action for lack
of sufficient evidence on the issue of informed consent and damages to her family. See Akron Doctor Goes to Trial in 'Right to Die' Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
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Likewise, in Bouvia v. Superior Court/58 a case requesting only
injunctive relief, the court properly noted the importance of the individual's autonomy interest.259 Ms. Bouvia suffered from cerebral
palsy, quadriplegia, and arthritis. 260 Although she was not terminally ill and, in fact, doctors expected her to live for another fifteen
to twenty years, her medical condition was not subject to cure and
her physical ailments permanently and irreversibly impaired her
ability to function. 261 While at the hospital, Ms. Bouvia became so ill
that she stopped eating because she could no longer swallow without vomiting. 262 No longer wishing to be in pain or be completely
dependent on others for all bodily functions, the plaintiff executed a
written instruction stating her unwillingness to undergo further
medical treatment. 263 Nonetheless, the hospital, concerned that her
weight loss might reach life-threatening levels, intentionally placed
her on life-sustaining treatment, inserting a feeding tube into Ms.
Bouvia against her express written instructions. 264
The Bouvia court recognized her right to have the nasogastric
tube withdrawn and prohibited its replacement on the basis of her
right to refuse medical. treatment, even that which is lifesustaining. 265 The court reasoned that the decision concerning one's
medical treatment belongs to each person.266 The court correctly
stated: "It is not a medical decision for her physicians to make. Neither is it a legal question whose soundness is to be resolved by lawyers or judges.... It is a moral and philosophical decision that, being a competent adult, is her's [sic] alone.,,267

1985, at A17; Judge Clears Doctor Who Refused Death Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 1985, at A24.
258. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986).
259. Id. at 301.
260. See id. at 299-300.
261. She was in constant pain, completely unable to care for herself in any
manner, and was dependent upon someone for "feeding, washing, cleaning,
toiIeting, turning, and helping her with elimination and other bodily functions."
Id. at 300.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 300 n.2.
264. See id. at 300.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 305. After winning the court's approval to have her feeding
tube removed, Ms. Bouvia elected not to remove the tube and is presently still
alive. See WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAw AND ETHICS 586 (5th ed.
1998).
267. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305. The Bouvia court goes to great lengths
to make sure that Ms. Bouvia's suffering is well-understood. Id. at 304 ("In
Elizabeth Bouvia's view, the quality of her life has been diminished to the point
of hopelessness, uselessness, unenjoyability and frustration. She, as the patient, lying helplessly in bed, unable to care for herself, may consider her existence meaningless. She cannot be faulted for so concluding.").
I agree that courts must be careful not to permit the refusal of medical
treatment only when they agree \vith it. The decisions should turn on whether
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Ms. Bouvia most likely would also have had a battery claim, as
the hospital and doctors subjected her to intentional harmful conduct against her written wishes. 268 Specifically, Ms. Bouvia had a
right to refuse sustaining medical treatment. She had exercised
this right and memorialized her election so that she would not have
to endure pain, suffering, and loss of dignity. 269 When health care
providers intentionally inserted a feeding tube into Ms. Bouvia's
body ,vithout her consent, their intentional and nonconsensual
touching caused a harmful condition that she had the right to prevent. 270 Thus, a patient in this situation could commence an action
for battery and seek monetary damages for medical expenses from
unwanted treatment.
The approach provided in the Leach and Bouvia cases reflects
respect for the rights of patient autonomy. A successful tort action
results in a court ordering the defendant to pay a certain sum of
money to the victim of his negligent or intentional wrongful conduct.
This award both compensates the plaintiff for her damages and deters the defendant and others from engaging in tortious behavior.271

the patient was competent to make a decision, or has properly designated a
surrogate to make a decision based on the individual's values and beliefs.
Some commentators have asserted that the court permitted Ms. Bouvia to
withdraw her life support only after concluding that her decision was rational
and "correct." See generally Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 281 (1977) (asserting that in
situations where the court is looking to the reasonableness of the patient's decision, whether explicitly so or not, "if patients do not decide the 'wrong' way, the
issue of competency will probably not arise"); Lois Shepherd, Sophie's Choices:
Medical and Legal Responses to Suffering, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 103, 124
(1996) (asserting that the recognition of a right to refuse medical treatment
"that is based solely in concerns about the individual's liberty or autonomy
would not require the court to discuss at length, as this court did, the diminished quality of Bouvia's life").
268. Section 13 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: "An actor is
subject to liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person ... ,
and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965). A comment to the Restatement states:
[A] surgeon who performs an operation upon a patient who has refused to submit to it is not relieved from liability by the fact that he
honestly and, indeed, justifiably believes that the operation is necessary to save the patient's life. Indeed, the fact that medical testimony
shows that the patient would have died had the operation not been
performed and that the operation has effected a complete cure is not
enough to relieve the physician from liability.
Id. § 13 cmt. c.
269. See Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300 & n.2.
270. See id. at 300-01. From the moment that the feeding tube was inserted, Ms. Bouvia e"-"Perienced pain and a loss of dignity that she would not
have endured had she been allowed to die. See id. at 299.
271. See PROSSER, supra note 246, § 4, at 22-23.
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Although permitting patients to recover in tort obviously exposes health care providers to more potential risks, health care providers may still be able to assert affirmative defenses. 272 Moreover,
health care providers who act in good faith will have no reason to
fear a battery or negligence claim because of the protections pro273
This is certainly an imvided in living will and proxy statutes.
provement over the current approach that protects the rights of the
health care provider, permitting the provider to err on the side of
life when faced with a request to end life-prolonging treatment with
which he or she disagrees. 274 If courts applied this approach to violations of the right to refuse treatment, they would acknowledge the
health care provider's duty not to treat without consent and allow
the trial process to determine whether the duty was breached. 275
Thus, a damage award in these cases will act as a deterrent to
health care providers.
Recognition of patients' rights and corresponding physician duties in this area should expand if courts apply tort principles in the
conventional manner to right to refuse treatment cases. Unfortunately, this may take a significant amount of time. As demonstrated by the Anderson opinion, many years may pass before such
claims routinely survive defendants' summary judgment motions. 276
Thus, some legislative modifications of the current law may be re. d.277
qUlre
272. Such affirmative defenses might include, for example, that the health
care provider reasonably believed that the patient making the demand was incompetent at the time, or that the decision was being made on behalf of an admittedly incompetent patient by some family members while other family
members disagreed. See, e.g., Ross v. Hilltop Rehab. Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528,
1533-34 (D. Colo. 1987).
273. All state living will and health care proxy statutes confer some sort of
immunity from civil and/or criminal liability to health care providers who in
good faith comply with a properly executed living will or the instructions of a
proxy acting in accordance ,vith the patient's ,vishes or in the patient's best interest. See 2 MEISEL, supra note 7, § 11.17, at 111 n.102 (listing living will
statutes); id. § 12.46, at 196 n.216 (listing proxy statutes).
274. See supra Part II.
275. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. c. (1965) (stating
that providing a remedy for legal violations best serves the deterrence function
of tort law).
276. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 195, at 711-17 (arguing that the popularity
of partial recovery for these actions may slow down the progress of providing a
full remedy for these violations).
277. A new legislative remedy may be required if courts continue to provide
immunity to health care providers who ignore a patient's right to forego medical treatment. This can be accomplished through the modification of the current advance directive statutes to include greater protection for the right to refuse treatment and providing specific guidance on damage awards for those who
ignore this important right. By providing immunity from civil liability, the
courts have given health care providers the power to override a patient's constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. This result clearly undermines the
purpose and goal of that right.
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C.

Responses to Those Who Think the Current Scheme Is Fine
Some commentators argue that the courts should not adopt a
new approach to right to refuse treatment damages actions. 278 Even
though courts have failed to grant plaintiffs complete relief for violations of their right to refuse treatment, the commentators claim
that the partial recovery currently available through the tort law
and the potential for professional licensing suspensions are sufficient to protect an individual's right to refuse medical treatment. 279
They oppose the development of new remedies-either a wrongfulliving tort or new statutes-because, in their view, courts are not
equipped to handle many of the questions posed by these situations
(e.g., whether a patient should be permitted to choose death).280
They also note that awarding damages would be antithetical to '''the
very nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind has
placed on human life, rather than its absence.",281
Moreover, at least one commentator has expressed concern that
any additional "[l]egal recognition that a disabled life is an injury
would harm the interests of those most directly concerned, the
handicapped.,,282 Professor Milani asserts that permitting persons
Although legislative action can always speed up tort reform, generally it is
necessary when the current legal system provides no remedy, or where the
courts are reluctant to ez..1Jand the law to apply to new areas. Neither of these
situations applies in the right to refuse treatment cases, so hope exists that
courts will apply traditional tort remedies.
278. See, e.g., Milani, supra note 97, at 230 (arguing that the current potential for recovery is sufficient for any violation of the right to refuse treatment);
Jon L. Spargur, Jr., Note, First Health Care Corp. v. Rettinger: Are Living Wills
Dead in North Carolina? 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 610-11 (1997) (arguing
that recent court decisions that permit providers to err on the side of life when
a request to end treatment appears ambiguous provide sufficient protection for
patient autonomy); see also Geoffrey Disston Minott & Vincent Phillip Zurzolo,
Comment, Wrongful Life: A Misconceived Tort, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 447, 45867 (1981) (arguing against the wrongful life tort for many of the same reasons
that commentators oppose the wrongful living tort).
279. See Milani, supra note 97, at 222-27 (asserting that plaintiffs should be
permitted to bring tort claims but damages should be limited); Sparger, supra
note 278, at 610-11 (arguing that a narrow interpretation of living ,vill remedies provides sufficient awards). But see Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George
Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ohio 1996) (awarding only nominal damages for a
battery claim for the right to refuse treatment). Clearly, neither the current
application of the tort law nor professional sanctions provide adequate compensation to the plaintiff or deterrence to health care providers.
280. See Milani, supra note 97, at 222; Peters, supra note 195, at 715-16.
281. Milani, supra note 97, at 154 (quoting Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d
345, 348 (Nev. 1995».
282. Id. at 218. Medical literature suggest that doctors often "estimate the
quality of life of chronically ill persons to be poorer than patients themselves
hold it to be and give this conclusion great weight in inferring, incorrectly, that
such person would choose to forgo life-prolonging treatment." Steven H. Miles,
Physicians and Their Patients' Suicides, 271 JAMA 1786, 1786 (1994); see also
Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Do Physicians' Own Preferences for LifeSustaining Treatment Influence Their Perceptions of Patients' Preferences?, 4 J.
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who are on life-sustaining treatment to sue their doctors provides
an incentive for doctors not to treat the disabled283 and encourages a
lack of respect for them. 284
These scholars focus on the potential for a partial remedy under
the current system and argue that this is sufficient.285 However, as
noted earlier, the case law demonstrates that the current scheme
does not adequately protect the right to refuse treatment. 2gS As Anderson showed,287 the court may determine that causation is lacking
or that no harm exists due to a simplistic, if not disingenuous, conception of the legally cognizable injuries resulting from failure to respect a patient's wishes. 28B Moreover, Anderson permits only nominal damages for a violation of the right to refuse treatment. 289 No
incentive currently exists for health care providers to obey the patient's wishes. 290 These scholars must acknowledge that often no
CLINICAL ETHICS 28, 31 (1993) (suggesting that not only do physicians "often
underestimate their patients' perceived quality oflife," but also that they may
"be influenced by, their own personal preferences").
283. Milani, supra note 97, at 218. Medical doctors' perceptions about the
quality of life of persons with disabilities may be overly negative. See David
Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair Discrimination Against the Sick, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49, 59-60 (1996)
(suggesting that doctors, in determining whether a patient is eligible for treatment, use the same costlbenefit analyses as do employers in determining
whether to hire a disabled person); Marsha Saxton, Prenatal Screening and
Discriminatory Attitudes About Disability, 13 WO:MEN & HEALTH 217,223 (1988)
(''By working in hospitals, with sick people, doctors generally see only those
cases of disability where there are complications, where patients are poorly
managed, or patients in terminal stages. Many physicians never have the opportunity to see disabled individuals living independently, productively, enjoyably.").
284. Milani, supra note 97, at 218-19; see Carol J. Gill, Suicide Intervention
for Persons with Disabilities: A Lesson in Inequality, 8 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 37,
38-39 (1992) (asserting that when persons with disabilities say they want to
die, it is treated as "natural" or "reasonable," while persons without disabilities
expressing the same wish are labeled "suicidal").
285. See, e.g., Milani, supra note 97, at 223-27 (arguing that nominal damages and recovery for extraordinary medical expenses are an adequate remedy
for a violation of the right to refuse medical treatment).
286. See supra Part II. For example, in Ohio, offensive conduct only entitles
the plaintiff to nominal damages. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George
Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ohio 1996). Moreover, professional sanctions,
which are rare, do not provide a mechanism to enforce a patient's decision and
further do not provide monetary recovery for unwanted medical treatment.
287. See supra notes 125-56 and accompanying text.
288. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 229.
289. Id.
290. Living will and other advance directive statutes, as well as professional
sanctions, fail to provide an appropriate remedy. See supra notes 113, 215-16;
see also Rich, supra note 113, at 1172 n.230 (arguing that the legislation
"serves only the interests of healthcare providers and the right to life movement").
Under Ohio law, a physician cannot be subjected to criminal prosecution,
professional disciplinary action, tort liability, or other civil action if the physi-
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remedy exists for violations of the right to refuse medical treatment.
This lack of remedy fails to provide protection for one of our most
important rights.
One should also remember that in cases when defendant health
care providers administer unwanted life-sustaining treatment, the
nature of the intrusion and the corresponding harm to the autonomy interest can be significant. For example, in Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center,291 health care providers placed a
competent and extremely ill patient on a ventilator against his will,
with a tube inserted in his throat via a tracheotomy.292 His hands
were restrained to prevent him from pulling out the tube.293 For a
competent but unwilling patient such as Mr. Bartling, that kind of
treatment can only be described as a form of torture. He was kept
in this state from April through November, 1984 when he died. 294
During the entire time he was in constant pain.295 The injustice in
not allowing Mr. Bartling's estate to recover should be apparent to
anyone who takes seriously the concept of informed consent and the
right to refuse medical treatment.
Moreover, the elderly and disabled should expect that doctors
\vill respect their medical decisions, even if they do not agree with
them. 296 These patients are entitled to receive the same medical
treatment as any other person. Health care providers should not
refuse treatment to these patients because of high costs or because
of a mistaken belief concerning the quality of life of the aged and
disabled. Moreover, medical professionals who presume that an
elderly or disabled person wants to die should be held liable, even
criminally, if they fail to use their best efforts to keep that person
alive.
What appears to underlie the anxiety of these commentators is
that the health care profession may not appreciate the quality of life
cian acts in good faith, in reliance on a health care decision, and in compliance
with a power of attorney statute. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.15(A)
(Anderson 1953 & Supp. 1997). A physician or health care facility can also refuse to comply or allow compliance with the instructions of a directive on the basis of conscience or any other basis, as long as they transfer the individual to a
physician or health care facility that ,vill comply with the directive. See id. §
1337.16(B)(1)-(2)(a). In addition, under Ohio law, a physician or health care
facility cannot be forced to provide or withhold health care to an individual
during an emergency situation. See id. § 1337.16(C).
These provisions make it difficult to determine under what circumstances
a physician or health care facility could actually be held liable for acting contrary to an individual's wishes. The provisions may actually provide the physician or health care facility with excuses for acting or not acting.
291. 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct. App. 1986).
292. ld. at 361.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See id. at 362.
296. For a discussion of the importance of personal autonomy and the right
to refuse medical treatment, see supra Part 1.
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that the aged and disabled lead.297 They fear that this misunderstanding will be enhanced by large damage awards in right to refuse treatment cases. 298
The denial of a remedy, however, fails to address their concern.
Rather, protection for elderly and disabled patients comes from the
procedural mechanisms that guarantee the proper exercise of the
right to refuse treatment. 299 Saying that a doctor is legally empowered or required to stop life support for someone who wants it
stopped is no justification for allowing a doctor to stop life support
for a disabled person who wants to live. The autonomy interest to
choose life or death need not devalue life; rather, it should honor the
choice for life just as much as, if not more than, it should honor the
choice for death. The Cruzan case300 made clear that states may
place a burden on the right to refuse treatment to ensure that uncaring physicians or greedy relatives do not take advantage of the
ill.301 However, the Cruzan Court recognized that some people
would be denied the right to refuse treatment because they failed to
assert it in compliance with the law. 302
Once someone has exercised the right to refuse medical treatment, in accordance with the law, he or she should receive a remedy
if a health care professional ignores his or her wishes. The perceived lack of adequate safeguards in the process should not result
in the denial of protection, i.e., a remedy, for all those who have lawfully exercised their right. It is better to respect the right of people
who have complied with the procedures by allowing a remedy, than
to have a right that is meaningless because it is unenforceable.
Doctors should not be permitted to displace the patient's exercise of
the right to refuse treatment. Each person should be free to make
his or her own decisions about the medical care that he or she receives at the end of life and should have his or her choices respected. Protecting an individual's autonomy interest justifies the
courts' process of learning to respect each individual's decision
about the medical. care he or she wishes to receive, particularly with
respect to life-sustaining care. As Dworkin has written, "[t]he

297. See supra note 282.
298. See supra text accompanying note 281.
299. See Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2
(1979) ("Judges have no monopoly on the task of giving meaning to the public
values of the Constitution, but neither is there reason for them to be silent.");
see also Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HAsTINGS L.J. 665, 681-82 (1987)
(urging the establishment of a new framework for enforcing rights in the federal courts).
300. See supra Part LA.
301. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281-83 (1990).
302. Id. at 284. See generally Friedman, supra note 22, at 777-80
(discussing the importance of the courts in setting forth and enforcing the remedy for violations of individual liberties).
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greatest insult to the sanctity of life is indifference or laziness in the
face of its complexity.'>3OJ
CONCLUSION

Advances in medical technology have drastically changed the
way physicians treat patients, affecting how, where, and when
Americans die. Many people expire only after being subject to heroic life-sustaining measures unheard of a few decades ago. In response to this medical development, courts and legislatures recognized the "right to die," stating that patients have a constitutional
or common law interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment. 304
Despite these attempts to secure the individual's right to refuse
medical treatment, the case law indicates that physicians routinely
ignore advance directives from patients.305 Obviously, one important reason for this is the fact that physicians and other health care
providers are almost immune from legal sanctions.
The fundamental obstacle to full implementation of the right to
refuse medical treatment is not the failure to recognize the right,
but the unwillingness of courts to remedy the violation of the right
by physicians. 306 This should not be the case. Federal and state law
expressly recognize the right to refuse medical treatment. If the
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is to have meaning, the law
must provide a remedy for intentional or negligent violations of this
right.
For understandable reasons, courts show a deep reluctance to
assess civil liability against health care providers who choose to
preserve life.307 The courts have not fully explored the fundamental
interests involved and have been one-sided in analyzing important
constitutional issues. The moral complexity of the issue, however,
does not excuse courts from their duty to enforce this fundamental
right.

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 240.
See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying te}..i;.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
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